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Cross-border acquisitions are popular tools for EMFs to create value by obtaining strategic assets 
and exploiting their productivity advantages in foreign markets.  My dissertation suggests that 
EMFs’ productivity serves as a signal of value creation potential in their cross-border 
acquisitions of DMFs. Further, EMFs could enhance their returns by cross-listing on advanced 
stock market exchanges, and by accumulating cross-border acquisition experiences across 
heterogeneous institutional environments.  A dataset of 466 Chinese Firms’ cross-border 
acquisitions in the time period of 2000-2010 supported my hypotheses.  
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 During the last two decades, the global economy has witnessed the rapid rise of 
multinationals from emerging markets. Outward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from 
developing countries has increased from 16.9% of global outward FDI in 1990 to 54.3% in 2014 
(UNCTAD, 2014). Cross-border acquisition is an important strategic vehicle for creating value 
through international expansion. In the midst of rapid globalization, acquiring Developed Market 
Firms (DMFs) offers Emerging Market Firms (EMFs) the opportunity to seek strategic assets 
and upgrade their capabilities (Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar and Chittoor, 2009; Figueiredo, 2011; 
Hope, Thomas, and Vyas, 2011; Peng, 2012).   
Despite the growth in the cross-border acquisitions of DMFs by EMFs, it is unclear how 
investors evaluate these acquisitions and whether EMFs create value through such transactions. 
Acquiring advanced technology and obtaining valuable brands are common motivations for 
emerging market cross-border acquirers (Antkiewicz and Whalley, 2006; Arnold and Javorcik, 
2005, Peng, Wang and Jiang,  2008; Peng 2012). However, for completed cross-border deals, 
Aybar and Ficici (2009) and Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) found that EMFs on average 
receive negative market reaction. Given the mixed findings regarding investors’ evaluation of 
EMFs’ cross-border acquisitions (Aybar and Ficici, 2009; Gubbi, et al., 2009), it is important to 
learn more about how EMFs enhance their competitiveness  through cross-border acquisitions of 
DMFs.  
Given the vast institutional differences between emerging markets and developed markets, 
recent studies examining value creation in EMFs’ acquisitions of DMFs have focused on the 
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influence of institutional characteristics (Gubbi, et al., 2009; Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009). 
Established internationalization theory suggests that cross-border acquirers are able to exploit 
their productivity advantages and cutting-edge business practices in foreign markets to create 
efficiency gains. In most of these studies, the acquirers are from transparent institutional 
environments and established industrial economies. However, these conditions are less 
immediately applicable to EMFs’ cross-border acquisitions of DMFs. Motivated by the need to 
upgrade their capability, EMFs rarely have competitive advantages relative to their counterparts 
in developed markets (Peng, Wang and Jiang, 2008; Madhok and Keyhani, 2012). EMFs have 
limited experience of reallocating strategic resources across national boundaries or of navigating 
global markets. Further, the underdeveloped institutional infrastructure of emerging markets 
greatly complicates investors’ evaluation of the potential deal value. Therefore, in the EMFs’ 
acquisitions of DMFs, investors might be suspicious about the integration between acquiring 
firms and target firms due to EMFs’ inexperience of competing in developed markets and the 
enormous differences between the two countries.  
For emerging market acquirers, one effective way to reduce investors’ evaluation 
discounting is to signal the potential value stemming from integrating DMFs and competing in 
developed markets. Thus this study examines how cross-border acquirers such as EMFs signal 
the value created in cross-border acquisitions to investors in order to receive favorable market 
reactions.  Kaufman (1988) and Varaiya (1987) showed that acquirers need to signal their ability 
to improve the target’s operational efficiency.  A reliable signal should have observable 
substance, be costly to develop, and indicate the potential value created in the acquisitions of 
target firms in developed market.  Previous literature found that (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; 
Capron and Pistre, 2002) superior productivity is an important competitive advantage of cross-
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border acquirers and crucial for transferring and combining strategic assets across different 
institutional environments.  For example, on Jan.5th 2008, Chinese renewable energy firm 
Xinjing Goldwind Group acquired Germany Vensys Energy AG and its stock price increased 
3.22% right after the announcement. In contrast, investors’ perception was less optimal of LDK 
Solar Co’ s acquisition of Italian solar company Green Technology SpA in 2009. The stock price 
of LDK Solar decreased 3.11% on the day of announcement.  Both of these two acquirers are 
non-SOE Chinese firms. They are both in renewable energy industries. The two target firms are 
European renewable energy companies. However, the productivity of Goldwind is 35% higher 
than LDK Solar. The superior productivity is not only an observable substance such as the 
amount of products but also crucial for potential value created in the cross-border acquisition 
deals. Therefore, in the acquisitions of DMFs, EMFs with superior productivity are more likely 
to receive higher evaluation from the investors.   
Productivity is costly to develop in the emerging market institutional environment. EMFs 
are new to the market-oriented competing logic of developed markets and may not be able to 
comply with multiple institutional logics at the same time. In developed markets, competition 
selects the most efficient firms with distinguished capabilities. In contrast, in emerging markets, 
EMFs are motivated to seek rents (Luo and Junkunc, 2008) due to the lack of effective 
institutional infrastructures (Khanna and Palepu, 1997).  Thus the institutional void of emerging 
economies also increases investors’ suspicions about EMFs’ potential to compete in developed 
markets. Underdeveloped institutional environments distort the market and increase the cost to 
enhance productivity, given that other non-market means are available for growth and profit. 
Thus EMFs need to signal their potential to compete in market-orientation institutions.   
3 
 
Further, through acquiring target companies, productive EMFs optimize shareholders’ 
investment by controlling more productive companies in a more developed institutional 
environment.  According to Assortative Matching Theory (Guadalupe, Rappoport, Salanie & 
Thomas, 2013), one necessary condition for creating synergy value is the existence of within-
characteristic complementarities between acquirers and targets. In other words, the synergy value 
of an acquisition would be much higher if the productivity of acquirer and target are alike. Thus, 
I hypothesize that EMFs’ productivity is positively associated with the market reactions to their 
cross-border acquisitions of DMFs. 
EMFs usually carry the burden of liability of emergingness  (Peng, Wang and Jiang, 2008; 
Madhok and Keyhani, 2012), and they have limited experience in reallocating strategic resources 
across national boundaries. Further, suffering from institutional void environments (Khanna and 
Palepu, 1997, 2000), EMFs seldom have sufficient financial capital to compete in the global 
market for corporate control. Thus, for productive EMFs, their competitive advantages may not 
be fully appreciated by foreign investors.  It is crucial for EMFs to strengthen the value of their 
productivity through obtaining legitimacy in global market of corporate control. Accordingly, I 
examine two methods to enhance the signaling effects of EMFs’ superior productivity in cross-
border acquisitions: one is cross-listing on advanced stock exchange market and the other is 
accumulating cross-border acquisition experiences across heterogeneous institutional 
environments of developed markets.  
Cross-listing refers to the situation in which a firm lists its stock on more than one stock 
exchange (Karolyi, 2006; Peng & Blevins, 2012). For cross-listed Chinese firms, the popular 
destinations are Hong Kong, U.S, Canada and U.K. Diversifying the listed markets provides 
EMFs with a cost advantage in raising financial capital and offsetting the domestic financial 
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constraints. The more affordable capital offers productive acquirers broader opportunities to look 
for more suitable target firms and reduce the constraints imposed by the institutional void 
environments at home. Through cross-listing, EMFs establish credibility by complying with 
foreign securities laws and committing to higher-level and more stringent regulations (Reese & 
Weisbach, 2002; Silva & Chavez, 2008). Cross-listing imposes a higher standard for acquirers’ 
corporate governance (Vaaler & Zhang, 2011) and quality of information disclosure (Herrmann, 
Kang and Yoo, 2015). The listing process potentially increases EMFs’ capability to learn from 
the target firms.  Cross-listed acquirers gain the capability to operate and compete in more 
market-oriented institutions that are similar to those of host countries. In the process of cross-
listing, EMFs successfully strengthen the signal value of their productivity. 
Given the stringent regulatory environment of established stock exchange markets, cross-
listing may not be suitable for all cross-border acquirers from emerging market. Thus, an 
alternative method to increase the value of productivity in cross-border acquisitions could be to 
accumulate cross-border acquisition experience in heterogeneous institutional environments.  
The breadth of their relevant institutional experience helps acquirers more effectively capture the 
transferrable best practices of the target and better customize them across different institutional 
environments; over time, acquirers might develop a more generalizable routine to better integrate 
target firms.  
The overall theoretical graphic model is depicted in Figure 1. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
In this paper, I aim to make a number of contributions. First, this study advances our 
understanding of applying the signaling framework to cross-border acquisitions. Compared to 
previous research, this study explains the situation where buyers’ signals are necessary and can 
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positively affect the market reactions to the transactions.  Considering how institutional 
characteristics increases information asymmetry and distorts investors’ perceptions,  this study 
also responds to calls for research on incorporating sociological factors into the asymmetric 
information literature (Akerlof, 2002). 
Second, examining how productivity influences firms’ performance in acquisitive growth 
and global expansion, the study reveals how firms’ productivity influences the value of the 
“changing productive opportunity” (Penrose, 1959) resulting from cross-border acquisitions.  
Also, focusing on acquirers from emerging markets, this study deepens theoretical insight into 
how EMFs create value in cross-border acquisitions of DMFs. I found that EMFs with higher 
productivity perform better in acquiring DMFs, indicating that EMFs’ productivity is a signal 
valued by investors. The traditional internalization literature shows that firms could leverage and 
exploit their advantageous productivity in foreign institutional environments. In the case of 
EMFs’ acquisitions of developed market targets, acquirers’ productivity advantage helps them to 
become credible bidders in the global market for corporate control.  
Third, I contribute to the cross-listing literature, in particular, to studies on the role of 
cross-listing in EMFs’ global expansion process. The understanding of cross-listing is very 
limited (Karolyi, 2006) and we have only preliminary knowledge on cross-listing’s role in firms’ 
growth (Peng and Su, 2013). I found that cross-listed EMFs enjoy greater benefits from the 
positive effects of productivity on the performance of cross-border acquisitions. The finding 
hints at the strategic function of cross-listing in EMFs’ internationalization process, such as 
accessing the global market, increasing corporate governance standards and receiving preferred 
evaluations from foreign investors.  
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Fourth, I present a new angle to explain value creation in cross-border acquisitions, in 
particular South-North acquisitions. I found that in the process of operating across heterogeneous 
institutional environments, EMFs accumulate the capability of capturing transferable and 
localizable business practice from target firms and optimize their global growth trajectory.   
This study also expands our understanding of using the ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors to 
explain the FDI flow (Anand & Kogut, 1997; Dunning, 2008). Previous studies identify political 
goals as the unique ‘push’ factors for EMFs (Cheng & Stough, 2007, p.15). However, it is 
unclear whether excess production capacity can serve as a push factor. This study shows that for 
certain EMFs, productivity is an important push factor and increases investor response to the 
cross-border acquisitions of DMFs. 
My sample consists of Chinese firms acquiring targets from developed markets. Chinese 
firms comprise an appropriate empirical setting for two reasons: one is that Chinese outward FDI 
into developed markets is noteworthy. China has the fastest growing outward FDI among 
emerging economies in recent decades (UNCTAD, 2014).  Second, according to McKinsey’s 
Global Growth Report (2015), the productivity of Chinese firms is the highest among Emerging 
Economies in the last decade. Thus it is an ideal laboratory for studying how productivity affects 
EMFs’ cross-border acquisition. A dataset of 466 Chinese Firms’ cross-border acquisitions in the 
time period of 2000-2010 supported my hypotheses.  
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2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Acquirer Productivity as a Signal of Value Creation Potential 
Information asymmetry is a characteristic of all acquisitions. In the EMF’s cross-border 
acquisitions of DMFs, investors rarely have sufficient information to accurately discern the 
potential value of the deal. One reason for the aforementioned mixed findings on the market 
reactions to EMFs’ cross-border acquisitions might be that investors are suspicious about the 
deal, due to their lack of information or signal on the potential value created in the deal.   
Signaling theory plays a key role in solving the information asymmetry issue and 
reducing the uncertainty of the deal (e.g.. Reuer, Tong, and Wu, 2012; Balakrishnan & Koza, 
1993).  As much as investors attempt to thoroughly evaluate the deal, the information on 
emerging market acquirers’ capability and their potentialities to integrate DMFs targets is mostly 
unavailable to them. To reduce offer price discounting due to investors’ suspicions (e.g., Akerlof, 
1970), acquirers then need to signal their ability to improve DMFs’ operational efficiency and 
create synergy value in the acquisitions (Kaufman, 1988; Varaiya, 1987).  The reliable signal 
should have observable substance, be costly to develop, and indicate the potential value created 
in the acquisitions of target firms in developed market.  
An important competitive advantage of cross-border acquirers is their superior capability 
to transfer and combine capabilities across different institutional environments (Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 2000; Capron and Pistre, 2002). Previous studies note that productive firms have 
higher likelihood of operating in different institutional environments. For example, Lileeva and 
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Traefler (2010) showed that higher productivity motivates domestic firms to export.  Similarly, 
Karim and Mitchell (2000) showed that acquirers are more likely to have advanced capabilities 
than non-acquirers. However, the productivity of some emerging market acquirers may not be 
sufficient enough for them to operate in developed countries or integrate DMFs.   
Between 1964 and 2012, the gap between productivity in emerging economies and 
developed economies has not significantly narrowed and the productivity of developed 
economies has remained about five times of that in emerging economies1. In the South-North 
cross-border acquisitions conducted by EMFs, it is unlikely for acquirers to transfer their 
advantageous productivity to target firms or exploit their productivity advantage in developed 
markets.  Thus it is not surprising that investors may have concerns about EMFs’ attempt to 
acquire DMFs.  Notwithstanding, a productive EMF can be a qualified acquirer due the notable 
fact that the productivity dispersion in emerging market is much greater than in developed 
economies. For example, Syverson (2004) found that within four-digit SIC industries in the U.S. 
manufacturing sector, the average difference in productivity between an industry’s 90th and 10th 
percentile (90-10 hereafter ) plants is about 2:1, however, Hsieh and Klenow (2009) found that in 
China and India, the average 90-10 productivity ratio is over 5:12.   
Given the great dispersion of productivity in emerging markets, the superior productivity 
is likely to be observable. More importantly, EMFs with superior productivity are more likely to 
be able to compete in developed markets and have complementary strategic capabilities 
1 Data Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre,  The Total Economy Database™, (TED) is a 
comprehensive database with annual data covering GDP, population, employment, hours, labor quality, capital 
services, labor productivity, and total factor productivity for about 123 countries in the world.   
2 The measurement of productivity employed in this paper is an extension of the single reference point model 
(Caves, Christensen, and Diewert, 1982) to capture the degree of dispersion.  This model uses a separate 
hypothetical firm reference point for each cross-section of observations and then chain-links the reference points 
together over time. It well captures the heterogeneity across productivity and reflects the cost of promoting firms 
productivity. 
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transferrable to the target companies. For cross-border acquirers from emerging markets, 
catching up with the most cutting-edge technology brings them first mover advantages in their 
domestic competition.  The productive EMFs are more capable of absorbing the valuable 
technology and know-how from target firms. Productive EMFs can learn faster and are in 
advantageous positions of transferring target firms’ technology in a value creating process. 
Compared to less productive EMFs, EMFs with superior productivity are viewed more favorably 
by investors. Thus the productivity, the substance of firms’ capability, signals the potential value 
created in the acquisitions of target firms in developed markets. 
Superior productivity is often costly to develop in emerging markets. EMFs are 
conditioned by the competing logic of an institutional void environment (Khanna and Palepu, 
1997) to such a degree that it is often very difficult to comply with the rules of an established 
market –oriented institutional environment. In emerging markets, the state monopoly has often 
severely curtailed the need to improve productivity.  Firms are motivated to seek rents (Luo and 
Junkunc, 2008) due to the pervasive administrative meddling of the government and the lack of 
effective institutional infrastructures such as intermediaries for strategic factors (Khanna and 
Palepu, 1997). The active acquirers from emerging markets may not have the advantageous 
capability or managerial expertise to compete in an advanced market. Their financial resources 
and the resulting acquisition offers might be the results of government support or of connections 
with politicians. Thus, the valid signal preferred by investors should be decoupled from 
institutional context and easy to interpret, such as EMFs’ intrinsic capability of utilizing 
resources. Productivity is a result of firms’ excess managerial capability and efficiency of 
operation (Penrose, 1959) and is less hinged on institutional characteristics such as regulatory 
environment, social norms and cognitive schema. Actually, in institutional void environment, 
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firms might be induced to invest in nonmarket strategy which may distract them from focusing 
on enhancing productivity. Oliver (1997) suggests that a firm’s sustainable advantage depends 
on its ability to manage the institutional context of its resource decisions. Though in recent years, 
emerging markets such as China have begun to emphasize the importance of developing 
technology, the resources provided by government through non-competing channels is still 
substantial. Firms choosing to increase their productivity in an institutionally void environment 
may bear an extra cost to pursue above-normal capabilities. Spence’s seminal work (1973) 
suggests that bearing extra costs to enhance skills actually signals superior productivity.   Thus 
for investors, the productivity of EMFs is a prominent signal of their potential to compete in 
developed markets.   
More importantly, compared to buying treasury stock and providing dividends to 
shareholders, using any excess financial capital to acquire DMFs is more likely to increase such 
firms’ value in long term. Productive EMFs are more likely to select better target companies and 
seize advantageous positions in domestic competition. The findings in previous studies suggest 
that acquiring foreign targets is an effective strategic tool to increase acquirers’ productivity 
(Bertrand & Zitouna, 2008; Schiffbauer, Siedschlag & Ruane, 2009; Arndt & Mattes, 2010; 
Bertrand & Capron, 2014; Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1987). Obtaining target firms’ capabilities, 
accessing strategic resources in foreign markets and accumulating experience across 
heterogeneous institutional environments boost the productivity of firms in the acquisitions. 
Overall, through acquiring target companies, productive EMFs optimize shareholders’ 
investment through holding controlling rights of DMFs. 
 Another reason why productivity is a reliable signal of future value created in cross-
border acquisitions is the institutional difference between emerging and developed markets. For 
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cross-border acquirers, the contextual factor such as institutional environment might exacerbate 
the information asymmetry problem. In particular, the institutional differences between emerging 
and developed markets are difficult to codify and evaluate (Khanna, 2014). Informational 
asymmetry caused by such differences increases investors’ suspicions about the integration 
between acquiring firms and target firms.  
In addition, Assortative Matching Theory (Guadalupe, Rappoport, Salanie & Thomas, 
2013) suggests that one necessary condition for creating synergy value is the existence of within-
characteristic complementarities between acquirers and targets. In other words, the synergy value 
of an acquisition would be much higher if the productivity of acquirer and target are alike. Given 
that the productivity of DMFs is on average, five times greater than that of EMFs, productive 
EMFs have a better chance to find matches in developed markets. Thus productive EMFs have 
better target pools to select from, compared to less productive ones.  
In summary, due to the information asymmetry in cross-border acquisitions of DMFs, 
investors search for reliable signals on the basis of which to evaluate the deal. Compared to other 
firm characteristics such as reputation or relationship with governments, productivity is an 
observable indicator of their capability to compete in a market-oriented economy. Productivity 
signals EMFs’ potential in integrating target firms. Given the vast institutional differences 
between emerging markets and developed markets, acquirers with transferable capabilities 
indicated by superior productivity are viewed more favorably by investors. Finally, productive 
EMFs could also select better matches and leverage their advantages to learn more from target 
firms. Thus I hypothesize that: 
H1: The productivity of EMFs is positively associated with the market reaction to their 
cross-border acquisitions of DMFs. 
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Competing in the global market for corporate control, EMFs need to overcome 
institutional voids domestically, in order to obtain the necessary key strategic resources such as 
capital, labor and information (De Soto, 1989; Guriev, 2004). At the same time, EMFs are 
perceived as inexperienced players in developed markets, thus to win over outside investors 
(Coffee, 1999), it is crucial for them to learn how to operate in heterogeneous institutional 
environments.  To enhance the effects of signaling EMFs’ capability of re-bundling a dynamic 
matrix of resources, strategic priorities, and capabilities across different institutional 
environments, I therefore consider the moderating roles of two types of institutional bridging 
experiences. One is bonding with more prestigious institutional environments through cross-
listing on advanced stock exchange markets; the other is accumulated acquisition experiences in 
developed markets.   
Moderating Effect of Cross-Listing 
Cross-listing refers to the situation in which a firm lists its stock on more than one stock 
exchange (Karolyi, 2006; Peng & Blevins, 2012). Hailing as they do from an institutional void 
environment, EMFs are likely to face higher costs associated with the cross-border acquisition 
process. Cross-listing provides EMFs access to foreign markets and signals the value of 
productivity to a much larger pool of investors (Leuz, 2006; Reese & Weisbach, 2002). Cross-
listed EMFs become more transparent and investors have more diversified sources from which to 
collect information. Besides increasing the credibility of the information, cross-listing also 
decreases investors’ search costs.  
Cross-listing suggests that EMFs are willing to ‘compete by the book’ in developed 
markets. In this way, their superior productivity is more likely to function and generate returns 
for shareholders. EMFs have very limited experience of competing in developed markets. Listing 
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is the admission of a company into a stock market after meeting certain requirements set by the 
regulatory authority of that particular exchange. Cross-listing signals EMFs’ commitment to 
abide by foreign securities laws. According to bonding theory, cross-listing the EMFs’ shares on 
a foreign exchange is an effective strategy for reputational differentiation, otherwise termed 
reputational bonding (Siegel, 2005). Foreign firms incorporated in a jurisdiction with weak 
investor protection rights cross-list on US securities markets to “legally bond” themselves to 
higher disclosure standards and stricter enforcement. Listing on an advanced international stock 
exchange is especially pertinent for EMFs that are relatively inexperienced in structuring deals 
and capturing post transaction synergies in cross-border acquisitions (Accenture, 2008). In the 
process of cross-listing, EMFs raise their ability to cope with the host country socioeconomic 
environments (Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991; Ghoshal and Westney, 1993), increase the quality 
of their corporate governance practices and enhance their skills of managing relationships with 
foreign investors. In the process they become obligated to hold managers accountable to 
shareholders, ensure shareholder voting privileges, prevent self-dealing by managers, and protect 
creditors. The successful adaptation to rules in established markets equip EMFs with the 
necessary capability to maneuver through a myriad of international requirements and regulations 
in cross-border acquisitions as well. Thus cross-listing allows EMFs to become qualified global 
players through legally bonding them to the higher standards and status of prestigious stock 
exchange markets. In the process, the signaling effect of productivity becomes stronger.  
Given the absolute gap of productivity between emerging market and developed market 
(McKinsey & Company, 2015), investors might have concerns about EMFs’ capability to 
integrate target companies. The process of cross-listing increases EMFs’ capability to absorb the 
competitive advantages of target firms and to compete in more established market-oriented 
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institutions. These capabilities are critical for the integration between acquiring firms and target 
firms that are located in two different institutional environments – e.g., in the due diligence and 
post-merger integration processes. For example, cross-listed EMFs that buy DMFs may have 
already adopted accounting standards that are similar to those of the host countries. Thus cross-
listing equips emerging market acquirers with the capability of better understanding the synergy 
opportunities present in the acquisition.   
According to Merton’s (1987) investors’ recognition hypothesis, which proposes that 
investors pay a premium for familiar assets, the cross-listed EMFs are more likely to receive 
positive market reactions than their counterparts. Investors are willing to pay more to buy an 
advanced market listed stock (Reese & Weisbach, 2002; Siegel, 2005). For cross-border 
acquirers from emerging markets, bonding with more prestigious stock exchanges and becoming 
familiar assets to foreign investors through cross-listing offer the opportunity to gain credibility 
and increase social status. Benjamin & Podolny (1999) showed that social status increases the 
firm’s intrinsic value. Thus the value of acquirers’ superior productivity is influenced by their 
social status as perceived by foreign investors.  Therefore, cross-listed acquirers can extract 
greater benefit from their superior productivity.  
One main challenge for EMFs in cross-border acquisition is their liability of 
emergingness, which attributes emerging market firms’ lack of competency to their country of 
origin. Emerging economies are commonly considered more opaque compared to developed 
markets. Cross-listing in general increases firms’ transparency and informational quality. The 
information asymmetry between acquirers and investors is reduced significantly for cross-listed 
EMFs.  Since cross-listing imposes more stringent regulations (Reese & Weisbach, 2002; Silva 
& Chavez, 2008) on informational disclosure, it allows EMFs to disclose their superior 
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productivity.  To highlight this, I compare the listing requirements across the New York Stock 
Exchange, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the Mainland China Stock Market (as shown in 
Table 1).  
Insert Table 1 here 
In the China stock market, some of the information disclosure requirements are vaguely 
defined. For example, all three stock exchange markets require listed companies to disclose 
price-sensitive information; however, the China Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) fails 
to provide a clear definition.  Unlike the regulatory agencies of the other two stock exchange 
markets, CSRC doesn’t require a listed company to comply with International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS). Thus cross-listing requires EMFs to disclose more accurate 
information following globally accepted accounting principles and allows international analysts 
to thoroughly review EMFs’ disclosures. Benefiting from the increased information transparency, 
productive acquirers can effectively signal their advantages in integrating target firms.  
In summary, cross-listing allows productive EMFs to mitigate any opaqueness in home 
country disclosure requirements, reputational liabilities imposed by home institutional void 
environments and their inexperience in global competition. In particular, cross-listing strengthens 
the value of the signal, and allows productive EMFs to become more qualified global players.  
Also, cross-listed acquirers gain the capability to operate and compete in more market-oriented 
institutions that are similar to those of their host countries. In the process of cross-listing, EMFs 
become more reliable and trusted acquirers through increasing their information transparency 
and signaling the premium value of their productivity. Therefore, I hypothesize that:  
H2: The relationship between the productivity of EMFs and the market reaction to their 
cross-border acquisitions of DMFs is stronger for cross-listed EMFs. 
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Moderating Effect of Acquirers’ Institutional Experience 
Despite its benefits, cross-listing might not be a suitable approach for all cross-border 
acquirers from emerging markets. Are there other appropriate strategies to strengthen the 
signaling effects of productivity in cross-border acquisitions?  It is challenging to evaluate the 
performance of business practices across different institutional environments featured with 
complex customs, languages, norms and values. Thus previous experience of transferring 
business practice and competitive advantages to similar institutional environment may be another 
factor that strengthens the credibility of EMFs’ productivity signal. 
Delios & Henisz (2003) showed that successful operations in different institutional 
environments generate distinct knowledge sets about each institutional environment and 
increases firms’ overall learning capability (see also Zeng, Shenkar, Lee & Song, 2013). The 
breadth of institutional experience in developed markets raises EMFs' tolerance toward different 
institutional rules and brings to EMFs a better understanding of market-oriented competition. 
Similar to cross-listed acquirers, acquirers who successfully operate in different institutional 
environments prove that they know how to utilize their newly acquired strategic assets in both 
home and other foreign institutional settings. With a more in-depth understanding of different 
regulatory regimes in global markets, EMFs are able to develop generally applicable routines 
which help them integrate target firms. For example, Mexican cement company CEMEX 
exemplified how experiences from similar regulatory environments enhance the value in cross-
border acquisitions (Ghemawat, 2007). 
Also, acquisitive EMFs frequently competing in the global market for corporate control 
are more transparent and visible to investors. Thus, less search cost is required for the market to 
recognize the value of experienced EMFs’ productivity in host country. Acquisitive EMFs then 
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are able to convince the potential investors about their experience in integrating target firms 
across heterogeneous institutional environments.  
The breadth of relevant institutional experience indicates firms’ past experience of 
diversifying across multiple developed market institutional environments. It is possible that 
multiple institutional environments present appropriate opportunities for firms’ capability sets. 
However, previous research shows empirical evidence of productivity heterogeneity at the 
institutional level (Syverson, 2011). The various sets of institutional settings across different 
countries support different levels of productivity and provide different trajectories of growth.  
When acquisitive acquirers are engaged in a number of heterogeneous institutional environments 
and are actively attempting to use their managerial resources in the most profitable manner, their 
sets of capability become adaptive as changes always occur in their external environment.  Thus 
the breadth of relevant institutional experience suggests the acquirers’ ability to adjust their 
productivity level and to operate at an optimal level of productivity. The acquirers with a greater 
breadth of institutional experience then are able to use newly available growth paths more 
effectively. 
Haleblian, Kim and Rajagopalan (2006) argue that involvement in prior acquisitions 
provides managers with important feedback that enables them to develop effective routines for 
use in future acquisitions. However, mergers and acquisitions tend to be complex and 
heterogeneous (Zollo, 2009), hence experience (and learning) gained from prior acquisitions in a 
similar context is more relevant to outcomes (Muehlfeld, Sahib and Witteloostuijn, 2012). 
Research demonstrates that acquisition performance improves when the acquiring firm has prior 
expertise in acquisition of targets from similar environments (Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002; 
Ellis, Reus, Lamont, and Ranft, 2011). Thus I consider the breadth of institutional experience in 
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developed markets.  Greater acquisition experience of the EMFs in the target country indicates 
familiarity with and knowledge related to managing acquisitions in that country. Such experience 
is likely to enable investors better evaluate EMFs’ capability, thereby complementing the 
benefits of superior productivity.  
In summary, the breadth of emerging market acquirers’ past institutional experience 
strengthens the signaling value of productivity in cross-border acquisitions in three ways: it helps 
acquirers more effectively capture transferrable business practices and better customize them 
across different institutional environments; secondly, it makes acquirers’ routines more 
generalizable and facilitates the integration process of the target firms; thirdly, it equips acquirers 
with the ability to quickly achieve the optimal level of productivity in a new institutional 
environment. Thus I hypothesize that: 
H3: The relationship between the productivity of EMFs and the market reaction to their 
cross-border acquisitions of DMFs is strengthened by EMFs’ breadth of institutional experience 
in developed markets. 
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3. METHODS 
Data and Sample   
I compiled the sample from SDC (cross-verified with S&P Capital IQ), based on country 
level, firm level and deal level characteristics. The time period is from 2000-2010 and all 
acquirers are public-listed firms in China, covering both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges. The research question and theoretical tension are grounded in the fact of a significant 
difference between acquiring firms’ home country and target firms’ countries. Thus the target 
firms are from developed countries. Based on the definition from the World Bank and the World 
Factbook of the Central Intelligence Agency, the developed nations in the sample meet the 
following criteria: 1. per capita GDP in excess of $15,000; 2. market-oriented economies; 3. 
democratic nations; 4. industrial countries. Developed countries have institutional environments 
differing from Emerging Markets and tend to have similar and stable institutional environments 
(Brint and Karabel, 1991). Following prior literature, I exclude privatizations, leveraged buyouts, 
spin-offs, recapitalizations, exchange offers, repurchases, acquisitions of minority interest, joint 
ventures, special treatment firms, government agencies and self-tender offers. I exclude deals in 
the financial industry (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) due to their accounting numbers being 
largely dependent on statutory capital requirements (Gomper, Ishii and Metrick, 2003). I deleted 
deals with insufficient stock price information for calculating cumulative abnormal returns. 
Adjusting for missing observations, the final sample includes 466 acquisitions of developed 
market targets conducted by 257 Chinese firms.  Among the 466 observations, 119 deals are 
conducted by 54 cross-listed firms, accounting for 25.5% of the sample. The distribution of deals 
across target countries is shown in Table 2.  
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Insert Table 2 here 
I recognize that there might be a selection bias in focusing on firms that choose M&A as 
a mode of international expansion. In preliminary analysis, I conducted a two-stage Heckman 
test. The ratio of foreign sales of acquirers is used to predict firms’ decision to engage in cross-
border acquisition. I identified a sample of 3459 domestic and cross-border M&A deals by 
Chinese publicly-listed firms to determine if there are any selection factors in the decision to go 
abroad. I used a probit model to determine which firms were more likely to go abroad. The 
obtained inverse Mills ratio from the probit estimation was incorporated into the second stage 
analysis. The results indicated a non-significant inverse Mills ratio, leading me to reject the 
hypothesis of a non-zero correlation between the unobservable components affecting the 
performance of the deal. This suggests that the unobserved factors that influence firms’ decisions 
in making cross-border deals are likely not associated with acquirers’ performance in cross-
border acquisitions.  
I obtained national level and Exchange Market Index data from World Economic 
Outlook, International Monetary Fund, and CIA databases. The variables for measuring firms’ 
productivity are collected from the annual industrial survey data3 from the Chinese National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS). All firms in China are required to participate in the NBS survey. This 
database includes firms’ financial information from 1998 to 2009. My deal observations are from 
2000-2010; to address the endogeneity concern, I use one year lag for the data on Productivity. 
The annual number of observations in the NBS data ranged from 162,033 to 336,768 belonging 
to a total of 557,554 firms. Several recent studies use this NBS data (e.g., Chang and Wu, 2014; 
Chang and Xu, 2008; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). 
 
 
3 Database Access Portal: http://www.allmyinfo.com/data/zggyqysjk.asp 
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Dependent Variables 
 Performance Measurement: 
I adopt the short-run abnormal equity price reaction to acquisition announcement as the 
reflection of acquisition performance. This variable is regarded as a reliable measure of the value 
consequences of acquisition (Kale, Dyer, & Singh, 2002). This measure has been extensively 
used in finance and strategic management studies of M&As, and used in similar studies that 
examine cross-border acquisition performance (e.g., Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar, & Chittoor, 
2010; Chen & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011). As argued by Cording, Christmann, & King (2008), the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is unbiased and invariant across different accounting policies 
adopted by firms. I use a 5 day window (-2,2) to compute CARs and use the market model as:  
ARit= Rit- (ai+biRmt)  
ARit is the daily abnormal return to the shareholders of acquiring firm i for day t. Rit is observed 
firm i’s return and Rmt is the stock listed market index return. The equation within the brackets is 
expected share price normal return. By regressing daily share price return on a daily market 
portfolio (index) return, the coefficients ai and bi are estimated for a given firm over a 200 day 
interval starting 250 days prior to the acquisition announcement and ending 50 days before the 
announcement. Coefficients are used to calculate expected return for a short time period around 
acquisition announcement. Abnormal return is the difference between actual return and expected 
return in the event window. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each security i, CARi, is 
formed by summing individual excess daily returns over a certain time window as follows: 
CARi,k,l=∑ARit, 
Where CARi,k,l is for the period from t=k days until t=l days. 
Thus, I cumulate the daily abnormal returns ARit over the 5-day window to calculate the 
CAR(2,+2), and I use the other event windows to perform robustness checks to verify results. In 
22 
 
the robustness analysis, I also use post-acquisition three year average ROA of acquirers to 
measure the performance.  
Independent Variables and Moderators 
Productivity:  To ensure that the comparison between any two firm-year observations are 
transitive, the measurement of firm’s productivity is based on a single reference point (Caves, 
Christensen, and Diewert, 1982).  The model I employed is an extension of this method, which 
uses a separate hypothetical firm reference point for each cross-section of observations and then 
chain-links the reference points together over time.   This extension method provides a consistent 
way of summarizing both the cross-sectional distribution of firms’ Total Factor productivity 
(TFP) and the moving trend over time. The productivity level of firm i in year t in a certain 
industry is in comparison with the productivity level of the hypothetical representative firm in 
base year 0 in that industry (Three-digit industry level (Caves et al., 1982; Olley and Pakes, 
1996). The multilateral TFP index for firm f in year t is defined as: 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐹𝑃𝑓𝑡 = (ln𝑦𝑓𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑡 ) + �(𝑡
𝑠=2
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑠 −  𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑠−1  ) −�  12 (𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑆𝑖𝑓𝑡 +   𝑆 𝑖𝑡) (ln 𝑥𝑖𝑓𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑡 )
−        ��  12 (𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑆 𝑖𝑠 + 𝑆 𝑖𝑠−1)(𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑠 − 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑠−1 )𝑡
𝑠=2
 
Where yt is the output of firm f and xift represents the set of inputs where i= 1,2,…, n. 
 𝑙𝑛𝑦  = 1
𝑚
 ∑ 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑓𝑚𝑓=1   , 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖  = 1𝑚  ∑ 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑓𝑚𝑓=1  , and  𝑆𝑖  = 1𝑚  ∑ 𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑚𝑓=1    
The first term expresses the firm’s output in year t as a deviation from the reference point 
and captures information on the cross-industry distribution in outputs. The second term considers 
the time trend effects which are the changes in the output reference point across all years. The 
measure is then the shift of the output distribution over time by chain-linking the movement in 
the reference point. The remaining two terms represent the same calculation for each input xi. 
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Inputs are weighted by a combination of firm factor shares 𝑆𝑖𝑡 and average factor shares  𝑆 𝑖𝑡 for 
each year.  
I include three kinds of inputs (Chang & Wu, 2014) in my computation: labor input 
which is measured as firm’s total number of working hours; intermediate inputs which are 
measured as (Cost of Sales + Operating costs)-(Wages + Depreciation cost +Expenses for 
purchased materials (if any)); and capital input which is measured by the sum of the book values 
of firms’ intangible and tangible assets. 
Cross-Listing: This variable receives a value of 1 if the acquiring firm is listed on both 
China Stock Exchanges and at least one of the following eight foreign markets: NYSE (U.S.), 
NASDAQ (U.S.), AMEX (U.S.), AIM (U.K.), LSE (U.K.), ASX (Australia), SGx (Singapore), 
and HKEx (Hong Kong). Hong Kong is the primary destination of Chinese Firms’ overseas 
listings. I consider Hong Kong as an overseas listing because Hong Kong is a separate 
jurisdiction from the PRC. More importantly, the listing guidelines in the Hong Kong stock 
market are very different and not controlled by the Chinese government. The characterization of 
a Hong Kong listing as an overseas listing is consistent with prior literature (e.g., Hung, Wong 
and Zhang, 2012).  
Breadth of Relevant Institutional Experience (BIE): The breadth of relevant institutional 
experience aims to capture the degree of focal firms’ diverse experience across heterogeneous 
developed markets.  For cross-border acquirers, the capability to gauge the institutional 
difference between home country and host country is crucial. Therefore, the breadth of relevant 
institutional experience is a better reflection of such capability if an institutional distance (ID) 
based dispersion measurement is used. Following Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, and Peng (2009) and 
Gubbi et al. (2010), I used the economic freedom index (EFI) to proxy the institutional 
environment. EFI is developed by the Heritage Foundation and has been widely used as a 
measure of ID (Gubbi et al, 2010). For each deal, I divided the value for each EFI component for 
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target country in that year by the respective EFI component of the China in that year. I averaged 
the results of all the ratios. The greater the value, the larger is the ID between the countries.  
                                                                                                 
To measure the degree to which the firm operated across different institutional 
environments, considering the dispersion of the institutional difference between focal firms’ 
home and host countries, I use Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of ID to proxy the breadth of 
institutional experience. The BIE of ID is calculated by the following formula for each 
observation. Deals with greater transaction values would have more significant influence. Thus 
the experienced based measurement should be weighted by deal size. 
𝐵𝐼𝐸𝛼𝑖 = �  𝑛
𝑖=1
�
𝐼𝐷𝑖 ∗
𝑑𝑠𝑖
∑ 𝑑𝑠𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ (𝐼𝐷𝑖 𝑛𝑖=1 ∗ 𝑑𝑠𝑖∑ 𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑖=1 )�
2
 
In the formula, α is the firm; i is the number of cross-border acquisitions of DMNCs firm 
α have engaged; dsi is the transaction value for deal i. A higher number suggests greater breadth 
of institutional experience.  
Control Variables  
I included several control variables at the deal, firm, industry, and country levels to 
account for auxiliary explanations and factors previously found to influence acquisition 
performance. All variables that vary by time are lagged by one year. 
Methods of payment have an impact on the performance of acquisitions. For example, 
using non-cash payment may help align the incentives of the acquirer and the target (Hansen, 
1987; Kohers & Ang, 2000; Datar, Frankel, & Wolfson, 2001; Ragozzino & Reuer, 2009). 
Payment type was coded 0 if the deal was cash, 1 if non-cash payment (Moeller, Schlingemann, 
and Stulz, 2007). The Multiple Bidders variable was coded 1 to indicate multiple bidders and 0 
otherwise (Coff, 2003). The takeover literature suggests that nature of the bid influences 
ytxtxyt EFIEFIID /=
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acquisition performance (Lang, Stulz, Walking, 1989) and so I constructed a dummy variable 
indicating the nature of the bid; hostile (0) or friendly (1). Deal size was the announcement value 
of the transaction (Lee and Caves, 1998).  
I controlled for eight firm characteristics that could potentially affect the market reaction 
to the acquisition announcement as well as characteristics that may be related to the explanatory 
variables (Lee & Caves, 1998). Firm size was measured by the logarithm of the average of the 
past three years’ total assets. Firm leverage was the average of the past three years’ ratio of long-
term debt to total assets prior to the event. Firms with free cash flow are likely to engage in 
wealth-destroying acquisitions because of agency issues. Prior performance, measured using the 
ratio of EBITDA to total assets at the end of the year before the focal acquisition is controlled for, 
since past profitability may influence future performance (Lee & Caves, 1998). In addition, 
according to Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) study, profitable firms with free cash flows are more 
likely to engage in wealth-destroying acquisitions due to agency problems. Firm age is measured 
by the number of years since the firm was initially listed on the home market. According to 
Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999), acquirers’ cross-border acquisition experience generates 
knowledge that affects market reaction to new acquisitions. Prior acquisition experience was 
measured by the number of cross border acquisitions during the 10 years before the focal 
acquisition. The experience variable was transformed as ln (1+n), where n is the number of prior 
acquisitions, in order to correct for the skewness of the experience variable. Similarities in 
business between the acquirer and the target have been found to be related to acquisition 
performance (Singh & Montgomery, 1987; Anand & Singh, 1997). I construct the variable 
“Dissimilar business” to measure whether the target is in the same business as the acquirer 
according to the similarity of the SIC codes of the acquirer and the target (Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1999). Specifically, if the acquirer and the target differ in their 3-digit SIC codes, 
“Dissimilar business” is coded as 1, and 0 otherwise. I also control for acquirers’ SOE (State-
26 
 
Owned Enterprise) status. State owned companies often have dominant political agendas that go 
beyond profit-maximizing business goals (Megginson & Netter, 2001). The state control 
paradoxically brings SOE more resources while also making them less transparent and efficient. 
I code SOE acquirers 1, otherwise 0. I also control for whether target firm is in the high 
technology industry, since this may lead to inflated cumulative abnormal returns (Travols, 1987; 
Ranft and Lord, 2000; Fresard, Hege and Phillips, 2014).  
Further, I controlled for institutional distance which influences EMFs’ performance in 
cross-border acquisitions (Gubbi, et al. 2010). Institutional distance measures the level of 
institutional development distance between the EMNC and DMNC countries (Busenitz, Gomez 
and Spencer, 2000). Finally, I control for inter-temporal trends with year dummy variables.  
Estimation Method 
The sample includes acquiring firms from the same country, China, and embedded in the 
same institutional environment. The assumption of independence across observations is thus 
questionable. Either the country fixed effects or random effects model may be appropriate to deal 
with this type of error structure. The main difference between fixed effects and random effects is 
whether there is correlation between the unobserved individual effects and the observed 
explanatory variables in the model. A fixed-effects model would be preferred if there is 
correlation between the unobserved effects and the regressors. A fixed-effects model can capture 
unobserved country-factors that impact the influence of productivity on returns in cross-border 
acquisitions.  The results of a Hausman test rejected the null hypothesis that the difference in 
coefficients of random effects and fixed effects is not systematic, and thus a fixed-effects model 
is appropriate for the analyses. Prior to estimating the regression model, I carried out a test for 
potential multicollinearity and found VIF values below 2 for all variables. These models provide 
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conservative tests for hypotheses because they capture within-country variation over time and 
eliminate across-country variation.4  
I used the following model to examine the effects of productivity on value created in 
international acquisitions and the moderating effects of cross-listing and breadth of institutional 
experience. 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(−2,2)𝑚𝑛𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑚𝑛𝑡 +  𝛽2𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 − 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑚𝑡+ 𝛽3𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑛𝑡+ 𝛽4𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 − 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝑚𝑛𝑡+ 𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝐵𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑛𝑡
+ �𝛽𝑖18
𝑖=6
𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑚𝑛𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑚𝑛𝑡 +  𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚𝑛𝑡 
  As mentioned earlier, the CAR(-2,2)mnt is the five-day abnormal return for the time 
window [-2 day, +2 day] for the acquirers. The subscripts, m, n and t stand for acquiring firm m, 
deal n and year t. As discussed above, the vector of controls included deal, firm, industry and 
country level controls at time t for firm m in deal n; industrymnt is used to account for target firm 
industry effects; yt is used to account for temporal unobserved effects and  𝜀𝑚𝑛𝑡 is the error term.   
 
 
 
4 To address concerns of endogeneity, I incorporate instrumental variable analysis for both the effects of political 
connections and of cross-listing on cross-border acquisitions. Detailed analysis is presented in the Result Section. 
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4. RESULTS 
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics and the correlations. It shows that the average 
cumulative abnormal returns of Chinese Firms’ cross-border acquisition of DMFs are slightly 
lower than 0, i.e., the mean is -0.003. The mean value for productivity is 0.229 with a standard 
deviation of 0.014. The mean value for cross-listing is 0.256 which shows that about 26% of the 
deals are announced by cross-listed firms. In terms of correlations, Table 3 shows that the 
productivity, breadth of institutional experience, cross-listing, acquisition experience are all 
positive and significantly associated with the cumulative abnormal returns (p<0.05). These 
correlations are consistent with what the hypotheses suggest.  
 Insert Table 3 here 
  Table 4 reports the empirical results of using country level fixed effects model to test the 
relationship between productivity and acquirer’s return. Model 1 is the base model with all the 
control variables. Model 2 examines the effect of productivity.  Model 3 and Model 4 examine 
the moderating effects of cross-listing and breadth of institutional experience respectively. Model 
5 is the full model including all the moderators and the interaction effects. Overall, the results are 
quite consistent across various model specifications with different sets of control variables.  
Insert Table 4 here 
   
           Model 1 is the benchmark model, and shows that acquirers’ cross-listing, acquisition 
experience and SOE status are positively significant. In Model 2, I found that productivity 
positively influences acquirers’ returns in cross-border acquisitions (p<0.001). The standardized 
coefficient is 0.029, suggesting that the cross-border acquisition performance of EMFs is 2.9% 
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higher for productive EMFs. Given that on average the acquirer’s return is close to zero (Jensen 
& Ruback, 1986), a 2.9% difference in short time market reaction CAR is economically 
significant. In 2010, the average market capitalization of publicly-listed Chinese firms is 203 
million U.S. dollars5 (In 2010, the average market capitalization of S&P 500 is 42.5 billion U.S. 
dollars and the average market capitalization of NYSE listed firms is 8.9 billion U.S. dollars). 
Thus on average, for productive EMFs, value created by acquiring DMFs is 5.89 million U.S. 
dollars more than less productive EMFs. It suggests that the effect of a 1% increases in 
productivity means an extra sixty thousand U.S. dollars of market capitalization. Model 3 reveals 
that this effect of productivity is stronger for cross-listed acquirers. For each unit increase in 
productivity, on average, the effect of productivity on cross-listed acquisition performance is 
strengthened by 3.5% to 4.0% (0.005+0.035).  Model 4 reveals the moderating effect of 
acquirers’ breadth of relevant institutional experience. For each unit increase in the breadth of 
institutional experience, on average, the effect of productivity on cross-border acquisition 
performance is strengthened by 13.7%.  In Model 5, results show that after including all the 
moderators and interaction terms, the hypotheses are still supported.  
          In order to illustrate the effects predicted by Hypotheses 2 & 3, I plotted the moderating 
effects of cross-listing and the breadth of institutional experience in Figure 2. Figure 2 Panel A 
presents the interaction effect between cross-listing and productivity. Cross-listed acquirers 
mostly receive a better reaction from the market and the relationship between productivity and 
cross-border acquisition is steeper for cross-listed acquirers. Similarly, in Figure 2 Panel B, the 
relationship between productivity and cross-border acquisition performance is stronger for firms 
with greater breadth of institutional experience.  
Insert Figure 2 here 
 
5 Source: Bloomberg & Hexun Finance 
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Robustness Checks and Supplementary Analysis  
  Endogeneity and Instrumental Variables: I recognize that there is a potential endogeneity 
issue for productivity.  There could be an unobserved variable simultaneously influencing both 
productivity and cross-border acquisition performance. To address such matters, I conduct 
instrumental variable analysis for cross-border acquisitions performance. I use the China Healthy 
Province Index to instrument productivity. Firms located in the province with higher Healthy 
Province Index are more likely to get access to healthier employees who have higher 
productivity. However, acquirers from provinces with a higher healthy index may not necessarily 
generate more in cross-border acquisitions of DMFs. I collect data from Economist Intelligence 
Unit6’s report of China Healthy Province Index (CHPI). The CHPI pulls together a substantial 
dataset to provide a detailed healthcare profile of each of China’s 31 provinces. The index is 
based on 25 quantitative indicators, ranking provinces according to which provinces are best 
placed in terms of resources and financing to meet current and anticipated healthcare demand. 
The four sub-dimensions of the index are Health Status, Health awareness, Health resources and 
Health financing.   I first run the endogeneity test of endogenous regressor: productivity (using 
‘endogtest’ command in stata). The test rejected the null hypothesis that the independent variable 
can be treated as exogenous. Thus I proceed with two stage analysis.  Table 5 shows the results 
from the first and second stages of the instrumental variables target country fixed effect 
regression (I employ the xtivreg2 package which allows taking account fixed effects while 
conducting instrumental variable analysis). I report results for post-estimation tests to examine 
the quality of the instrumental variable. The under-identification test, which is indicated by the 
Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic, confirms that the model is identified. The weak identification test 
estimates whether the instrument is relevant and strong enough. The F-statistic nears the critical 
6 The Economist Intelligence Unit (The EIU) is the world's leading resource for economic and business research, 
forecasting and analysis. It provides accurate and impartial intelligence for companies, government agencies, 
financial institutions and academic organizations around the globe, inspiring business leaders to act with confidence 
since 1946.  
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value for 25% maximal IV size (5.551 versus 5.53), suggesting that the instrument is relevant. 
Also, the Hansen’s J statistic shows that the null hypothesis that the instrument is exogenous 
cannot be rejected. Overall, both pre-estimation and post estimation tests reveal that the 
instrumental variable “firm headquarters’ CHPI index” satisfies the conditions of relevance and 
exogeneity.  Overall, I found that productivity has a significant and positive influence on firms’ 
returns in cross-border acquisitions. This suggests that the exogenous component of the 
productivity positively influences firms’ returns.  
Insert Table 5 here 
I also conducted several robustness tests to further verify the findings. Specifically, I 
examined the results using alternative specifications of the dependent and independent variables.    
First is using alternative dependent variables for performance. Considering the efficiency 
of information dissemination in the stock market announcements (Miller, Li, Eden & Hitt, 2008), 
I further conduct robustness checks by employing 11 (+/-5 around the announcing day) day-time 
window to calculate CAR (-5,5) and 3 (+/-1 around the announcing day) day-time window to 
calculate CAR (-1,1). Table 6 & Table 7 show that both CAR (-5,5) and CAR (-1,1) models are 
significant. The 3 day-time window CAR (-1,1) (Table 6) presents the strongest set of results 
which indicate that the market responses to the signal mostly around the day of the 
announcement. The 11 day-time window model shows that market gradually prices in the 
signaling effect. 
Insert Table 6 here 
Insert Table 7 here 
 
It is important to consider the effects of productivity on long term post-acquisition 
performance. Thus I conducted alternative measurements for long-term performance which are 
the changes in ROA and changes in Tobin’s q.  Table 8 & table 9 show that for both changes in 
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ROA value and changes in Tobin’s q, the productivity is significant. Overall, the influences of 
productivity on post-acquisition ROA are stronger than on post-acquisition Tobin’s q. It 
indicates that productivity has a greater impact on the post-acquisition firm performance, 
compared to its impact on the market value.   
Insert Table 8 here 
Insert Table 9 here 
 Second, I tested the moderating hypotheses with sets of alternative specifications of 
moderators. For cross-listing, I use a continuous measurement to reflect how firms’ cross-listed 
markets are different from their home institutions. The Breadth of cross-listing (BCL) reflects the 
dispersion of developing stages across different financial markets that acquirers listed. Following 
previous literature, I use stock market capitalization7/GDP ratio (Levine, 1997) as the indicator 
of financial market development (FMD). For example, in 2009, the stock market capitalization of 
public corporations in the United States totaled over $ 15 trillion, 113% of the GDP in that year. 
Thus the FMD would be 1.13. In contrast, China’s market capitalization that year is slightly 
higher than $3.5 trillion which accounts for 71% of its GDP. China’s 2009 FMD therefore is 
0.71. In 2002, China’s market capitalization is 0.45 trillion which is 34% of its GDP. This shows 
that China’s stock market has experienced rapid growth; however, compared to the U.S market, 
it is still underdeveloped. I use Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of FMD indicators to proxy the 
breadth of cross-listing. The BCL of FMD is calculated by the following formula for each 
observation. 
7 Market capitalization (also known as market value) is the share price times the number of shares outstanding. 
Listed domestic companies are domestically incorporated companies listed on the country's stock exchanges at the 
end of the year. Listed companies do not include investment companies, mutual funds, or other collective investment 
vehicles. 
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In the formula, α is the firm; i is the number of market firm α listed. A higher number suggests 
greater cross-listing dispersion, i.e., the inclusion of a more dispersed set of financial markets. I 
found that BCL is positively and significantly moderating the relationship between productivity 
and performance in cross-border acquisitions. Overall, regardless of subsample or specifications, 
the results were qualitatively the same. 
Thirdly, I examined the relationship between cross-listing and institutional experience. 
Though they are different methods of strengthening the signaling effect of productivity, firms 
could employ both of them to amplify the positive effect. The result of interaction effect between 
these two is positive. It suggests a complementary effect for these two paths. Actually, for cross-
listed acquirers, a greater number of cross-border acquisitions could result in compounding effect 
on the signaling role of their superior productivity.  
Fourth, I also conduct a sub-group analysis for non-SOE (table 10) and SOE (table 11) 
firms. Previous literature shows that SOEs and private firms are different in terms of their 
strategic goals such as whether pursuing production efficiency and profit maximization 
(Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991, Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001, Megginson & Netter, 2001). In an 
emerging economy, the government often plays a central role in allocating strategic resources 
and the SOEs are mostly in favor of winning important assets to conduct cross-border 
acquisitions, especially after the ‘Go Global’ policy initiated by the government to stimulate 
Chinese SOEs to invest abroad (Deng, 2009). Given the political agenda carried by SOEs, it is 
causing a stronger signaling effect to have superior productivity. By the same token, SOEs are in 
a favorable position to receive low cost financial capital. Their cross-listing shows their 
willingness of disclosing information and abiding to more stringent regulatory regimes. Thus in 
table 11 the result is overall stronger than in table 10. 
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Insert Table 10 here 
Insert Table 11 here 
Also, I conducted industrial level sub-group analysis using the Fama–French 12-industry 
categorization8. Tables 12 to 16 present the results for industries with sufficient observations. 
Overall, the results showed that Business & electronic equipment industry and business service 
industries are significant. For Energy and oil industry, the results are mostly insignificant. 
Overall, it indicates that the industry concentration and government subsidiary might be 
interesting contingencies on the productivity – cross-border acquisitions performance 
relationship. 
Insert Table 12 here 
Insert Table 13 here 
Insert Table 14 here 
Insert Table 15 here 
Insert Table 16 here 
 
In the sub –group analysis of target countries with sufficient observations, the results 
showed that productivity has a strong significant signaling effect in acquisitions of Australian 
and U.S. firms. Table 17 to Table 21 present the results for target countries with sufficient 
observations. 
Insert Table 17 here 
Insert Table 18 here 
Insert Table 19 here 
Insert Table 20 here 
Insert Table 21 here 
8 http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/deHaan/documents/industries_ff12.txt 
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5. DISCUSSION 
 
Traditional theories of FDI suggest that potential advantages in input costs, market access 
and advanced technology comprise the motivating rationale for MNCs to expand globally. 
However, the majority of Emerging Market MNCs are in disadvantaged positions relative to 
their counterparts in developed markets, in terms of access to strategic resources, technological 
capability and experience in international competition. For example, in semiconductor wafer 
factories, Chinese technologies are ‘at least two generations behind those of the United States, 
Japan, and South Korea’ (BusinessWeek, 2009: 42).  Apparently, the recent wave of South-North 
cross border acquisitions is not driven by the exploitation of competitive advantage. Therefore, 
EMFs’ cross-border acquisitions of DMFs suggest a new theoretical puzzle for both firm growth 
theory and internationalization literatures.  The steady growth trend of cross-border acquisitions 
of DMFs by EMFs reflects that, rather than harvesting their competitive advantages like their 
pioneering DMFs, the EMFs are using cross-border acquisitions of DMFs as important strategic 
vehicles to accelerate capability acquisition. Deals like Lenovo’s 2004 purchase of IBM’s 
personal computer business and CNOOCS’ attempt to acquire Unocal are examples. Not 
surprisingly, without accumulated experience in international competition and suffering from the 
absence of necessary supportive institutional infrastructures, the adventure of EMFs in global 
market of corporate control on average, despite their acquisitions of valuable resources, often 
receives negative market reactions and destroys shareholders’ value. Yet, given the importance 
of South-North acquisitions for the growth of EMFs, such type of global corporate strategy will 
36 
 
still play a significant role for EMFs’ competition in the foreseeable future. Accordingly, it is 
crucial for managers, policy makers and scholars to understand how EMFs compete in the global 
market for corporate control, in particular, how EMFs reduce investors’ suspicions about their 
global expansion.  
Starting with reviewing the mixed findings in EMFs’ cross-border acquisitions of DMFs 
and considering the motivations of such acquisitions, I noted that investors’ suspicions may be 
founded on the productivity differences between EMFs and DMFs and the institutional 
difference between emerging and developed markets.  
Most of Chinese MNCs can only compete on low cost and are still struggling to provide 
new and better products. Short on innovation and lacking their own distinctive products, many 
Chinese firms expand by taking orders from overseas markets and selling them under foreign 
brand names. This situation-best described as “production without products” (Coase & Wang, 
2013, Page 189). Thus it is difficult for mediocre productivity EMFs to adapt to and compete in 
developed markets. Their generically low productivity disqualifies them from being competitive 
bidders in the acquisitions of DMFs. On the other hand, a key feature of emerging markets is the 
absence of an established institutional infrastructure that firms take for granted in developed 
markets (Khanna and Palepu, 2006). In this institutionally void environment, resource allocation 
is inconsistent with firms’ competitive advantages within and across industries. Several emerging 
market industries (e.g. telecom, retail, insurance) historically have experienced minimal 
competition and enjoyed national protectionism in international trade, particularly from foreign 
players. Thus it is not surprising that the outside investors are uncertain about EMFs’ capability 
to compete in developed markets.   For EMFs engaged in cross-border acquisitions, it is then 
crucial to signal their qualifications in global competition.   
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My findings support the hypothesized positive influence of productivity on market 
reactions to EMFs’ cross-border acquisitions of DMFs. Strikingly, I noticed that in emerging 
markets, the contribution of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) to the national economy growth has 
increased from 11 percent before 1978 to more than 40 percent afterwards in the early 2000s 
(Perkins & Rawski 2008). This suggests that productive EMFs play an increasingly important 
role in shaping China’s economy and growth. The finding suggests that the benefits of signaling 
superior productivity are likely to depend on the informational environment of signals, such as 
institutional differences between a target country and an acquirer country. The contingency 
perspective I develop suggests that both cross-listing and the breadth of institutional experience 
enhance signaling effects. Besides providing more affordable financial capital, cross-listing 
increases EMFs’ credibility and makes them more transparent.  Also, cross-listing offsets EMFs’ 
liability of emergingness and makes them stronger competitors in global markets; equips EMFs 
with the necessary capability to understand the value and advantages of potential target firms and 
makes them better learners in the acquisitions. One other way to reap more value from cross-
border acquisitions of DMFs is to accumulate past cross-border acquisition experience across 
relevant institutional environments.  
Several contributions emerge from this study.  First, this study advances our 
understanding of applying the signaling framework to cross-border acquisitions. Signaling theory 
plays an important role in understanding the asymmetric information in various markets (e.g., 
Spense, 1974; Riley, 2001; Stiglitz, 2002). When it comes to applying signaling theory to the 
acquisitions literature, previous studies largely focuses on explaining how sellers signal quality 
to maximize their value share in the transaction. In contrast, this study explains situations where 
acquirers’ signals are necessary and can positively affect the investors’ responses to the 
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transactions.  Considering how institutional characteristics increase information asymmetry and 
distort investors’ perceptions,  this study also responds to calls for research on incorporating 
sociological factors into the asymmetric information literature (Akerlof, 2002). 
Second, with respect to studies on the relationship between cross-border acquisition and 
productivity, the main interest has concentrated on how cross-border acquisition influences 
acquirers’ productivity (Lichterberg & Siegel, 1987; Bertrand & Zitouna, 2008; Arndt & Mattes, 
2010; Bertrand & Capron, 2014) rather than on the effect of productivity on acquirers’ 
performance in the acquisitions.  By examining the relationship between productivity and market 
reactions to EMFs’ acquisitions of DMFs, this study complements prior M&A research in 
management and finance by addressing the important yet neglected question about how 
productivity influences value creation in acquisitions.  In doing so, this study synthesizes the 
growth theory of the firm and the internalization literature. It extends our understanding on how 
firms’ intrinsic capability influence the value of ‘changing external conditions’ (Penrose, 1995).  
Third, by examining the moderating role of cross-listing, I address an important question 
of how EMFs overcome financial constraints and the liability of emergingness in cross-border 
acquisitions. Given the ongoing interest in the puzzle of why EMFs fail to create value for 
shareholders even when they acquire valuable strategic assets, this study illustrates one strategic 
means for EMFs to better leverage resources possessed by target firms.  
Fourth, through examining the contingency of relevant institutional experience, the 
results showed that alternatively, EMFs could accumulate knowledge through operating across 
heterogeneous institutional environments to strengthen the signaling effects of productivity. It is 
worth noticing that essentially both types of strategies reflect EMFs’ efforts of overcoming home 
market institutional void environments. Therefore in future studies, it would be useful to assess 
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how the effectiveness of these two types of strategies changes when EMFs’ home institutional 
environment improves over time.  
Fifth, this research contributes to the literature on internationalization process. It is 
interesting to reveal how EMFs utilize their relative productivity to generate value for 
shareholders in the acquisitions of DMFs. The finding implies that the value of firms’ 
productivity in global expansion process hinges on both the characteristics of their home 
institutional environments and their responses to the institutional differences between home and 
host markets.  
Also, this study contributes to the FDI literature, in particular to our understanding of 
using ‘pull’ and ‘push’ factors to explain the motivations of FDI. For example, Anand & Kogut 
(1997) found that the rival technological capabilities are ‘push’ factors while market 
opportunities and technology sourcing are ‘pull’ factors.  The findings in supplementary analysis 
confirm that industrial rivalry is a strong push factor. For example, it shows that in highly 
competitive industries such as business service and electronic equipment production, the effects 
of productivity are stronger. However, it would be interesting to examine how industry 
concentration influences value created in cross-border acquisitions in future studies.  ‘Pull’ 
factors are concerned with the attractions of a particular location. Previous studies centered on 
studying pull factors such as indigenous resources, capability and market (RCM). Focusing on 
Chinese firms’ FDI, Cheng categorized resource-acquiring, market expanding and efficiency-
improving as three main pull factors. Overall, these pull factors fit the classic international 
expansion model (Dunning, 1980, 2008). On the other hand, the conditions inside China present 
new features for push factors. Besides market conditions such as domestic competition and 
demand for natural resources, push factors for Chinese companies include the political goals of 
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Chinese government support and abundant foreign exchange (Cheng & Stough, 2007, p.15). 
However, in emerging economies, it is unknown whether excess production capacity serves as a 
push factor. This study shows that production capacity of EMFs could be an effective push factor, 
consistent with previous studies such as Anand & Kogut (1997). 
Last but not least, this study helps us understand how MNCs strategize their growth 
models across different institutions. Nobel laureate Krugman concludes that Asian growth driven 
by investment in input and capital is a myth (1994) but his prediction of the failure of Asian 
economy may have failed. Conventional wisdom recommends Western Economy’s Growth 
Mode which relies on productivity and efficiency. However, Jorgenson & Vu (2013) noted 
recently that the balance of power in the G20 has shifted from the leading industrialized 
economies of the G7 to the emerging economies, especially China and India. The rise of the 
Asian model of economic growth will change the balance of the theory of economic growth from 
productivity and innovation to investment in human and nonhuman capital.  The findings in this 
study show that EMFs with higher productivity receive better market reactions when they 
acquire DMFs. They indicate that besides complying with institutional norms, MNCs need to 
localize their growth mode to host countries.  Productive EMFs are easier to fit in developed 
market economic systems compare to EMFs relying on extensive growth. By the same token, for 
DMFs entering emerging economies, they might receive a better market reaction by increasing 
their investment in non-market factors. 
Limitations   
Despite these contributions, my study is subject to some boundary conditions. First, 
although the mechanisms I described above are prevalent across emerging economies (Hoskisson, 
Wright,  Filatotchev, & Peng, 2013), there may still be some sample peculiarity issues.  Each 
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institution has its unique policy regime change and idiosyncrasies are pertinent across emerging 
economies. Within emerging economies, the differences are largely centered on the relationship 
between productivity and policy regime changes. For example, India’s economic reforms were 
initiated in 1991 and the accelerated GDP growth had not appeared until 2003. Also the 
trajectory of productivity growth across different industries varies across countries. More cross-
country comparative studies could be done to further justify the influence of productivity and the 
moderating roles of cross-listing and breadth of institutional experience. 
Second, the cross-listing status influences the integration process significantly, thus a 
qualitative approach could be valuable for further explaining the value creation mechanism for 
cross-listed acquirers. 
Future Research 
  Akerlof argues (2002) that asymmetric information ultimately leads us to behavioral 
economics. Information asymmetry at an institutional level greatly complicates the problem of 
computability (Simon, 1955). For both acquirers and investors, more effective strategic tools are 
necessary to overcome the inevitability of bounded rationality. For instance, anchoring at 
previous deals and performance of pioneering acquirers might be a starting point.  
 It is also important to consider the impact of productivity on EMFs’ likelihood of 
acquiring DMFs. High productivity creates unused managerial resources which become available 
for further growth and influence the direction and scope of a firm’s activities. The future growth 
moves in directions that utilize the excess capacity of competencies. In the case of EMFs, 
entering developed markets through acquiring productive DMFs is the one of the most efficient 
ways to utilize their unused managerial resources in their home market. Productivity reflects a 
firm’s capability to utilize resources and plays an important role in firms’ internationalization 
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processes. Previous studies note that productive firms have a higher likelihood of operating in 
different institutional environments. For example, Lileeva and Traefler (2010) showed that 
higher domestic productivity motivates firms to export.  Similarly, Karim and Mitchell (2000) 
showed that acquirers are more likely to have advanced capabilities than non-acquirers.  In fact, 
the well-established ‘Penrose Effect’ (Penrose, 1959) implies that for less productive firms, the 
limitation of managerial resources places a constraint on their acquisitive growth (Penrose, 1959). 
The acquisitive growth then is more appropriate for firms with excess capacity.   This seemingly 
conflicting reasoning reveals an important yet somewhat neglected question: how does a firm’s 
productivity influence their performance in acquisitions? In particular, how does the market 
respond to cross-border acquisitions conducted by a firm with low productivity? On one hand, 
cross-border acquisition answers firms’ needs to increase productivity; on the other hand, the 
increased ‘productive opportunity’ (Penrose 1959) resulting from acquisitions may not be fully 
utilized by those acquirers with strongest incentives.  Thus in future studies, it would be 
interesting to examine how productivity influences the likelihood of EMFs’ acquisition of DMFs.  
 Last but not least, productivity enhances EMFs’ capability to recognize synergy 
opportunities with target companies and helps them select more suitable target companies. It is 
important to examine how productivity influences the duration (time to completion) of cross-
border acquisitions of DMFs.  
Conclusion 
This study utilizes signaling theory to conceptualize the theoretical linkage between 
superior productivity and higher market evaluation in EMFs’ cross-border acquisitions of DMFs.  
By examining how productive EMFs enhance their returns in cross-border acquisitions through 
cross-listing and the breadth of relevant institutional experience, I have sought to deepen 
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theoretical insights into how the liabilities of emergingness and lack of strategic resources are 
addressed by EMFs in their global expansion process, in particular, in South-North acquisitions.  
In a broader sense, the study indicates new theoretical linkages between productivity and 
acquisition performance. In terms of practical implications, it shows that for cross-border 
acquirers, it is important to adapt to the preferred growth mode of target countries, especially 
when that growth mode is different from that of the home country.  By revealing the influence of 
productive EMFs’ cross-listing and institutional experience on their performance in cross-border 
acquisitions, I hope to initiate a conversation about how emerging market acquirers signal their 
quality to influence market reactions to their moves. 
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Table 1. Three Major Listing Destinations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXCHANGE NYSE (USA) HKEx (Hong Kong) SSE(China)
Function Market-Oriented Market-Oriented Regulation Oriented
Regulatory Agency
U.S. Securities 
and Exchange 
Commission (SEC)
Securities & 
Futures 
Commission (SFC)
 of Hong Kong
Chinese Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC); & 
MOC
SASAC
NDRC
(SAFE)
Financial Information Requirement Hong Kong FRS or IFRS US GAAP or IFRS PRC GAAP
Min. Number of Shareholders 5000 for foreign issuers 300 1000
Min. Market Cap of publicly held shares US 100M HK50m 50MRMB
Profit
pre-tax: greater 100M US 
earnings over last 3 years
after tax, greater 
than 50M HK
for the last 3 years
Profitable for 3 consecutive years and 
greater than 30M RMB
Min shares traded on market 1100 thousand greater than 25% greater than 10%
Annual financial report yes in 3 months yes in 3 months yes in 4 months
half year report yes in 2 months yes in 2 months yes in 3 months
quarterly report no no yes
Price sensitive information disclosure yes yes
Related transactions yes yes
Disclosure of significant management shareholdings yes yes
Not clearly defined,  the overall  
definition of "any information could 
lead to price change" is very vague. 
Listing Requirements Comparison
From: 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nyse.shtml
https://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/rulesreg/listrules/rulesandguidelines.htm
http://english.sse.com.cn/
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Table 2. Sample Distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Number ofDeals
Number of
Cross-listed Deals
Percentage of
Cross-listed Deals
Australia 89 31 34.83%
Austria 2 0 0.00%
Belgium 4 3 75.00%
Canada 61 14 22.95%
Denmark 3 0 0.00%
Finland 1 0 0.00%
France 17 11 64.71%
Germany 31 7 22.58%
Greece 1 0 0.00%
Israel 1 0 0.00%
Italy 7 3 42.86%
Japan 19 4 21.05%
Netherlands 10 2 20.00%
New Zealand 2 0 0.00%
Norway 4 0 0.00%
Portugal 4 0 0.00%
Singapore 49 12 24.49%
South Korea 7 0 0.00%
Spain 4 0 0.00%
Sweden 3 1 33.33%
Switzerland 2 1 50.00%
United Kingdom 21 4 19.05%
United States 124 26 20.97%
Total 466 119 25.54%
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Table 4. Fixed-Effects Models Predicting Chinese Firms' CBA Returns, 2000-2010 
 
Model1
CAR5
Model2
CAR5
Model3
CAR5
Model4
CAR5
Model5
CAR5
Productivity H1 0.029 *** 0.025 *** 0.013 * 0.011 *
(Multilateral TFP Index) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Productivity* Cross-Listing H2 0.035 *** 0.033 ***
(0.008) (0.007)
Productivity* Institutional Experience Breadth H3 0.137 *** 0.118 **
(0.043) (0.042)
Moderators
Cross-listing 0.086 *** 0.012 *** 0.005 ** 0.012 *** 0.006 **
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Institutional Experience Breadth 0.082 *** 0.062 *** 0.057 *** 0.027 + 0.027 +
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014)
Control Variable
Deal Characteristics
Deal Size -0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.021) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Payment Type 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Nature of Bid 0.001 -0.002 -0.003 + -0.003 * -0.002 + -0.003 *
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Multiple Bidder -0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 + 0.002 + 0.002 *
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Characteristics
Acquirer Firm Size 0.948 *** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.039) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Acquirer Leverageb 0.149 *** -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.021) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Acquirer Firm Age -0.012 * 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisition Experience 0.888 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 ***
(0.059) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Acquirer's Past Performance 0.244 *** 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002
(0.017) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Acquirer is SOE 0.002 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.005 ** 0.005 *** 0.004 *
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Target in High Tech Industry -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dyad Characteristics
Acquirer & Target in different 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
industries (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Institutional distance -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included
Inverse Mill's Ratio -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Oversea Sales 0.003 ***
(0.000)
Constant -5.2523 *** -0.009 -0.019 -0.016 -0.013 -0.011
(0.384) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 3459 466 466 466 466 466
Pseudo-R-Square 0.4804 ***
Adj. R-Square 0.2898 *** 0.3837 *** 0.4138 *** 0.3964 *** 0.4324 ***
Probit
Cross-Border
 Country=23,  Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
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Table 5. Fixed-Effects Instrumental Variables Predicting Chinese Firms' CBA Returns, 2000-
2010 
 
1st Stage 2nd Stage
xtivreg2
Deal Size 0.011 -0.001
(0.025) (0.001)
Payment Type 0.025 0.000
(0.035) (0.001)
Nature of Bid 0.033 -0.002 +
(0.048) (0.001)
Multiple Bidder 0.054 0.002
(0.043) (0.001)
Acquirer Firm Size 0.023 ** -0.000
(0.008) (0.000)
Acquirer Leverageb 0.006 -0.001
(0.017) (0.000)
Acquirer firm Age -0.003 0.000
(0.003) (0.000)
Acquisition Experience -0.032 -0.000
(0.031) (0.006)
Acquirer's Past Performance -0.056 0.000
(0.163) (0.005)
Dissimilar Business -0.014 -0.000
(0.038) (0.001)
SOE 0.062 0.004 +
(0.057) (0.002)
High Tech Industry -0.012 -0.002
(0.043) (0.001)
Strategic Industry 0.047 0.000
(0.046) (0.001)
Year Dummy Include Include
Industry Dummy Include Include
Institutional distance -0.061 -0.003
(0.087) (0.003)
Inverse Mill's Ratio 0.034 -0.001
(0.069) (0.002)
0.014 ***
(0.000)
Productivity 0.021 **
(0.007)
Constant 0.014 0.011
(0.398) (0.009)
Observation 466 466
(Centered) R-Square 0.084 *** -1.871 ***
5.432
(p=0.013)
KP rk Wald F(weak Identification ) 5.551
Hansen J stat (Over-identification) 0
 Country=23,  Standard 
errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
Instrumental Variables
for Productivity
CHPI Index
Kleibergen_Paap(KP) rk LM stat
(Under-identification test)
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Table 6. Fixed-Effects Models Predicting Chinese Firms' CBA Returns, 2000-2010 
 
 
Model1
CAR3
Model2
CAR3
Model3
CAR3
Model4
CAR3
Model5
CAR3
Productivity H1 0.0324 *** 0.028 *** 0.013 * 0.012 *
(Multilateral TFP Index) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
Productivity* Cross-Listing H2 0.037 *** 0.034 ***
(0.008) (0.008)
Productivity* Institutional Experience Breadth H3 0.144 *** 0.123 **
(0.044) (0.043)
Moderators
Cross-listing 0.008 *** 0.011 *** 0.005 ** 0.011 *** 0.005 *
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Institutional Experience Breadth 0.085 *** 0.063 *** 0.058 *** 0.027 + 0.027 +
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014)
Control Variable
Deal Characteristics
Deal Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Payment Type 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Nature of Bid -0.004 + -0.003 + -0.003 * -0.002 + -0.003 *
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Multiple Bidder 0.002 0.002 0.002 + 0.002 + 0.002 *
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Characteristics
Acquirer Firm Size -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Acquirer Leverageb -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Acquirer Firm Age -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisition Experience 0.003 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Acquirer's Past Performance 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Acquirer is SOE 0.005 *** 0.006 *** 0.005 ** 0.005 *** 0.004 *
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Target in High Tech Industry 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dyad Characteristics
Acquirer & Target in different -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
industries (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Institutional distance -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Constant -0.010 -0.021 * -0.017 + -0.015 -0.013
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Observations 466 466 466 466 466
Adj. R-Square 0.2721 *** 0.3241 *** 0.3556 *** 0.3381 *** 0.3647 ***
 Country=23,  Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
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Table 7. Fixed-Effects Models Predicting Chinese Firms' CBA Returns, 2000-2010 
 
 
Model1
CAR11
Model2
CAR11
Model3
CAR11
Model4
CAR11
Model5
CAR11
Productivity H1 0.027 *** 0.024 *** 0.009 0.009
(Multilateral TFP Index) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
Productivity* Cross-Listing H2 0.034 *** 0.032 ***
(0.007) (0.008)
Productivity* Institutional Experience Breadth H3 0.135 * 0.115 *
(0.043) (0.042)
Moderators
Cross-listing 0.009 *** 0.012 *** 0.006 ** 0.012 *** 0.007 **
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Institutional Experience Breadth 0.079 *** 0.062 *** 0.059 *** 0.027 + 0.028 +
(0.010) (0.009) (0.002) (0.014) (0.014)
Control Variable
Deal Characteristics
Deal Size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Payment Type 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Nature of Bid -0.004 * -0.003 + -0.003 * -0.002 + -0.003 *
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Multiple Bidder 0.001 0.002 0.002 + 0.002 + 0.002 *
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Characteristics
Acquirer Firm Size -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Acquirer Leverageb -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Acquirer Firm Age -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisition Experience 0.003 * 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Acquirer's Past Performance 0.002 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Acquirer is SOE 0.005 * 0.006 *** 0.005 ** 0.005 *** 0.004 *
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Target in High Tech Industry 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dyad Characteristics
Acquirer & Target in different -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
industries (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Institutional distance -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Constant -0.009 -0.018 + -0.015 -0.013 -0.011
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 466 466 466 466 466
Adj. R-Square 0.2507 *** 0.3074 *** 0.3365 *** 0.3200 *** 0.3448 ***
 Country=23,  Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
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Table 8. Fixed-Effects Models Predicting Chinese Firms' CBA Returns, 2000-2010 post-
acquisition Change in ROA  
 
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5
Productivity H1 0.618 *** 0.675 *** 0.816 + 0.823 +
(Multilateral TFP Index) (0.102) (0.117) (0.411) (0.425)
Productivity* Cross-Listing H2 1.173 * 1.352 *
(0.293) (0.237)
Productivity* Institutional Experience Breadth H3 7.511 + 8.365 +
(4.011) (4.221)
Moderators
Cross-listing 0.304 * 0.111 0.096 0.098 0.143
(0.148) (0.146) (0.146) (0.146) (0.222)
Institutional Experience Breadth 0.422 0.788 0.615 2.701 2.711
1.101 (1.081) (1.092) (1.569) (1.677)
Control Variable
Deal Characteristics
Deal Size 0.026 0.011 0.009 0.008 0.004
(0.095) (0.092) (0.091) (0.092) (0.092)
Payment Type 0.346 * 0.336 * 0.344 * 0.339 * 0.336 *
(0.122) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117)
Nature of Bid -0.002 0.042 0.043 0.044 0.044
(0.148) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142) (0.142)
Multiple Bidder 0.089 0.078 0.076 0.068 0.065
(0.152) (0.157) (0.146) (0.147) (0.146)
Firm Characteristics
Acquirer Firm Size 1.265 *** 1.311 *** 1.302 *** 1.308 *** 1.297 ***
(0.181) (0.174) (0.174) (0.173) (0.173)
Acquirer Leverageb 0.006 0.038 0.037 0.037 0.037
(0.059) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Acquirer Firm Age -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Acquisition Experience 0.128 0.123 0.124 0.124 0.124
(0.138) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131)
Acquirer's Past Performance 3.236 *** 3.395 *** 3.457 *** 3.439 *** 3.514 ***
(0.676) (0.651) (0.651) (0.649) (0.651)
Acquirer is SOE 0.034 0.027 0.001 0.063 0.038
(0.202) (0.194) (0.195) (0.195) (0.195)
Target in High Tech Industry -0.375 * -0.323 * -0.323 * -0.323 * -0.321 *
(0.146) (0.141) (0.141) (0.141) (0.141)
Dyad Characteristics
Acquirer & Target in different -0.198 -0.187 -0.181 -0.187 -0.187
industries (0.132) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127)
Institutional distance 0.471 + 0.489 + 0.527 * 0.458 + 0.498 +
(0.265) (0.251) (0.262) (0.259) (0.260)
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Constant -4.975 *** -5.586 *** -5.711 *** -5.259 *** -5.367 ***
(1.139) (1.109) (1.112) (1.128) (1.129)
Observations 466 466 466 466 466
Adj. R-Square 0.2670 *** 0.3079 *** 0.3288 *** 0.3395 *** 0.3578 ***
 Country=23,  Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
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Table 9. Fixed-Effects Models Predicting Chinese Firms' CBA Returns, 2000-2010 post-
acquisition Change in Tobin's Q  
 
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5
Productivity H1 0.697 ** 0.523 * 0.938 + 0.894 +
(Multilateral TFP Index) (0.203) (0.212) (0.491) (0.484)
Productivity* Cross-Listing H2 1.599 * 1.661 **
(0.625) (0.629)
Productivity* Institutional Experience Breadth H3 1.785 2.834
(3.414) (3.413)
Moderators
Cross-listing 0.222 * 0.148 0.432 ** 0.151 0.448 **
(0.097) (0.098) (0.147) (0.098) (0.149)
Institutional Experience Breadth 0.668 0.203 0.032 *** 0.066 (0.068)
(0.762) (0.729) (0.731) (1.134) (1.127)
Control Variable
Deal Characteristics
Deal Size 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.006
(0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
Payment Type 0.073 0.069 0.058 0.068 0.055
(0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.078)
Nature of Bid -0.051 -0.035 -0.038 -0.035 -0.038
(0.097) (0.095) (0.095) (0.096) (0.095)
Multiple Bidder 0.351 * 0.345 * 0.348 *** 0.348 *** 0.348 ***
(0.101) (0.099) (0.098) (0.099) (0.099)
Firm Characteristics
Acquirer Firm Size -0.059 -0.044 -0.032 -0.043 -0.031
(0.118) (0.117) (0.116) (0.117) (0.117)
Acquirer Leverageb 0.074 + 0.086 * 0.087 * 0.087 * 0.087 *
(0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Acquirer Firm Age -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Acquisition Experience -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025
(0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.089)
Acquirer's Past Performance -0.309 -0.249 -0.332 -0.259 -0.352
(0.443) (0.438) (0.437) (0.439) (0.437)
Acquirer is SOE -0.045 -0.042 -0.078 -0.343 *** -0.066 *
(0.133) (0.131) (0.131) (0.132) (0.132)
Target in High Tech Industry 0.058 0.078 0.092 0.083 0.098
(0.095) (0.094) (0.094) (0.095) (0.095)
Dyad Characteristics
Acquirer & Target in different 0.181 * 0.185 * 0.178 * 0.184 * 0.178 *
industries (0.087) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.085)
Institutional distance 0.264 0.271 0.219 0.278 0.229
(0.163) (0.174) (0.174) (0.175) (0.175)
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 0.586 0.351 0.522 0.274 0.406
(0.754) (0.747) (0.745) (0.762) (0.076)
Observations 466 466 466 466 466
Adj. R-Square 0.1336 *** 0.1650 *** 0.1769 *** 0.1644 *** 0.1775 ***
 Country=23,  Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
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Table 10. Fixed-Effects Models Predicting Chinese Firms' CBA Returns, 2000-2010 non- State 
Owned Enterprise 
 
 
Model1
CAR5
Model2
CAR5
Model3
CAR5
Model4
CAR5
Model5
CAR5
Productivity H1 0.029 *** 0.028 *** 0.029 + 0.019
(Multilateral TFP Index) (0.005) (0.006) (0.017) (0.019)
Productivity* Cross-Listing H2 0.024 0.026
(0.017) (0.018)
Productivity* Institutional Experience Breadth H3 -0.003 0.051
(0.113) (0.118)
Moderators
Cross-listing 0.008 *** 0.012 *** 0.009 ** 0.012 *** 0.009 *
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Institutional Experience Breadth 0.093 *** 0.085 *** 0.082 *** 0.086 * 0.068 +
(0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.033) (0.034)
Control Variable
Deal Characteristics
Deal Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Payment Type 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Nature of Bid -0.009 + -0.009 * -0.009 * -0.009 * -0.009 *
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Multiple Bidder -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Firm Characteristics
Acquirer Firm Size -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Acquirer Leverageb -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Acquirer Firm Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisition Experience 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Acquirer's Past Performance 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.01) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Target in High Tech Industry 0.002 0.004 0.004 + 0.004 0.004 +
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Dyad Characteristics
Acquirer & Target in different 0.003 0.008 0.001 0.001 0.001
industries (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Institutional distance 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Constant -0.044 + -0.052 + -0.026 -0.052 * -0.023
(0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Observations 155 155 155 155 155
Adj. R-Square 0.2871 *** 0.4015 *** 0.4130 *** 0.4015 *** 0.4145 ***
 Country=23,  Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
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Table 11. Fixed-Effects Models Predicting Chinese Firms' CBA Returns, 2000-2010 State 
Owned Enterprise 
 
 
Model1
CAR5
Model2
CAR5
Model3
CAR5
Model4
CAR5
Model5
CAR5
Productivity H1 0.031 *** 0.026 *** 0.006 * 0.009 **
(Multilateral TFP Index) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Productivity* Cross-Listing H2 0.042 0.034 **
(0.009) (0.010)
Productivity* Institutional Experience Breadth H3 0.192 *** 0.140 **
(0.049) (0.051)
Moderators
Cross-listing 0.008 *** 0.012 *** 0.003 0.012 *** 0.005 +
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Institutional Experience Breadth 0.082 *** 0.056 *** 0.052 *** 0.005 0.015
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017)
Control Variable
Deal Characteristics
Deal Size 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Payment Type 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Nature of Bid -0.003 -0.002 + -0.002 -0.002 + -0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Multiple Bidder 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Firm Characteristics
Acquirer Firm Size -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Acquirer Leverageb -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Acquirer Firm Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisition Experience 0.004 * 0.004 *** 0.005 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Acquirer's Past Performance 0.002 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.002
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Target in High Tech Industry 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dyad Characteristics
Acquirer & Target in different -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
industries (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Institutional distance 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Constant -0.002 -0.011 -0.009 -0.001 -0.002
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 311 311 311 311 311
Adj. R-Square 0.2541 *** 0.4503 *** 0.4887 *** 0.4758 *** 0.4938 ***
 Country=23,  Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
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Table 12. Fixed-Effects Models Predicting Chinese Firms' CBA Returns, 2000-2010 Consumer 
goods (non-Durable goods) Industry  
 
Model1
CAR5
Model2
CAR5
Model3
CAR5
Model4
CAR5
Model5
CAR5
Productivity H1 0.042 + 0.023 0.049 0.026
(Multilateral TFP Index) (0.019) (0.019) (0.084) (0.074)
Productivity* Cross-Listing H2 0.083 0.083
(0.044) (0.049)
Productivity* Institutional Experience Breadth H3 -0.051 -0.016
(0.578) (0.495)
Moderators
Cross-listing 0.035 * 0.033 ** -0.002 0.034 + -0.001
(0.012) (0.009) (0.021) (0.015) (0.074)
Institutional Experience Breadth -0.053 0.025 0.031 0.042 0.035
(0.060) (0.061) (0.051) (0.211) (0.172)
Control Variable
Deal Characteristics
Deal Size -0.013 * -0.011 * -0.002 -0.012 -0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Payment Type 0.010 0.012 * 0.006 0.012 0.006
(0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Nature of Bid -0.011 -0.008 + 0.001 -0.008 0.001
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Multiple Bidder 0.005 0.011 -0.000 0.012 -0.001
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
Firm Characteristics
Acquirer Firm Size 0.019 0.033 * 0.016 0.034 0.016
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019)
Acquirer Leverageb 0.007 0.011 * 0.003 0.011 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Acquirer Firm Age 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Acquisition Experience -0.014 *** -0.024 + -0.026 + -0.023 + -0.026 +
(0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
Acquirer's Past Performance 0.009 -0.017 -0.019 -0.019 -0.021
(0.053) (0.045) (0.038) (0.056) (0.048)
Acquirer is SOE 0.019 0.029 0.046 * 0.027 0.046
(0.021) (0.017) (0.018) (0.028) (0.029)
Target in High Tech Industry -0.003 -0.012 -0.007 -0.013 -0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009)
Dyad Characteristics
Acquirer & Target in different -0.003 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.006
industries (0.002) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
Institutional distance 0.021 0.002 -0.007 0.002 -0.007
(0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017)
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Constant -0.081 -0.153 + -0.162 -0.159 -0.073
(0.071) (0.066) (0.087) (0.103) (0.011)
Observations 39 39 39 39 39
Adj. R-Square 0.2654 *** 0.2826 *** 0.2926 *** 0.2948 *** 0.3237 ***
 Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
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Table 13. Fixed-Effects Models Predicting Chinese Firms' CBA Returns, 2000-2010 
Manufacturing Industry  
 
Model1
CAR5
Model2
CAR5
Model3
CAR5
Model4
CAR5
Model5
CAR5
Productivity H1 0.027 * 0.024 * -0.009 -0.024
(Multilateral TFP Index) (0.011) (0.012) (0.025) (0.027)
Productivity* Cross-Listing H2 0.015 0.028
(0.021) (0.021)
Productivity* Institutional Experience Breadth H3 0.201 0.261 +
(0.126) (0.131)
Moderators
Cross-listing -0.001 0.005 0.003 0.004 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Institutional Experience Breadth 0.108 *** 0.061 + 0.056 0.024 0.003
(0.022) (0.032) (0.032) (0.038) (0.041)
Control Variable
Deal Characteristics
Deal Size 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Payment Type -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Nature of Bid -0.008 + -0.006 + -0.007 + -0.005 -0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Multiple Bidder 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Firm Characteristics
Acquirer Firm Size 0.013 + 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Acquirer Leverageb 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Acquirer Firm Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Acquisition Experience -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Acquirer's Past Performance 0.028 0.021 0.017 0.024 0.017
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Acquirer is SOE -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Target in High Tech Industry -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Dyad Characteristics
Acquirer & Target in different -0.003 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005
industries (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Institutional distance -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Constant -0.104 * -0.075 * -0.108 * -0.108 -0.087 *
(0.041) (0.029) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Observations 68 68 68 68 68
Adj. R-Square 0.2522 *** 0.2830 *** 0.3048 *** 0.2905 *** 0.3127 ***
 Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
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Table 14. Fixed-Effects Models Predicting Chinese Firms' CBA Returns, 2000-2010; Energy  
Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction Industry  
 
Model1
CAR5
Model2
CAR5
Model3
CAR5
Model4
CAR5
Model5
CAR5
Productivity H1 0.027 0.024 -0.004 -0.004
(Multilateral TFP Index) (0.023) (0.025) (0.038) (0.039)
Productivity* Cross-Listing H2 0.035 0.025
(0.071) (0.072)
Productivity* Institutional Experience Breadth H3 0.216 0.021
(0.206) (0.022)
Moderators
Cross-listing 0.007 0.010 0.002 0.009 0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.017) (0.007) (0.017)
Institutional Experience Breadth 0.208 ** 0.156 * 0.146 + 0.111 0.011
(0.058) (0.074) (0.079) (0.085) (0.089)
Control Variable
Deal Characteristics
Deal Size -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Payment Type 0.011 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Nature of Bid -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Multiple Bidder -0.011 -0.015 -0.014 -0.011 -0.011
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Firm Characteristics
Acquirer Firm Size -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Acquirer Leverageb 0.006 + 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Acquirer Firm Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisition Experience -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Acquirer's Past Performance -0.056 -0.042 -0.034 -0.046 -0.041
(0.051) (0.052) (0.055) (0.052) (0.056)
Acquirer is SOE 0.016 + 0.015 + 0.015 + 0.010 0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Target in High Tech Industry 0.013 0.014 + 0.012 0.008 0.007
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Dyad Characteristics
Acquirer & Target in different 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.002
industries (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Institutional distance 0.022 0.034 0.026 0.026 0.021
(0.016) (0.019) (0.026) (0.021) (0.021)
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Constant -0.095 -0.098 -0.071 -0.073 -0.055
(0.071) (0.069) (0.088) ().073) (0.091)
Observations 55 55 55 55 55
Adj. R-Square 0.1608 *** 0.1801 *** 0.2043 *** 0.2226 *** 0.2342 ***
 Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
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Table 15. Fixed-Effects Models Predicting Chinese Firms' CBA Returns, 2000-2010 Business & 
Electronic Equipment Industry  
 
Model1
CAR5
Model2
CAR5
Model3
CAR5
Model4
CAR5
Model5
CAR5
Productivity H1 0.046 *** 0.043 *** 0.062 * 0.064 *
(Multilateral TFP Index) (0.006) (0.006) (0.031) (0.029)
Productivity* Cross-Listing H2 0.058 * 0.059 *
(0.028) (0.029)
Productivity* Institutional Experience Breadth H3 -0.116 -0.143
(0.213) (0.203)
Moderators
Cross-listing 0.007 0.011 ** 0.004 0.011 *** 0.003
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Institutional Experience Breadth 0.087 * 0.081 ** 0.076 * 0.106 + 0.109 *
(0.039) (0.027) (0.025) (0.053) (0.051)
Control Variable
Deal Characteristics
Deal Size 0.007 * 0.005 * 0.004 * 0.005 * 0.004 *
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Payment Type -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Nature of Bid -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.005 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Multiple Bidder 0.004 0.006 + 0.006 * 0.006 * 0.006 *
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Firm Characteristics
Acquirer Firm Size -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.004 -0.006
().006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Acquirer Leverageb -0.002 -0.002 + -0.002 + -0.002 + -0.002 +
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Acquirer Firm Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
().000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisition Experience -0.000 *** -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Acquirer's Past Performance 0.006 0.022 0.017 0.022 0.019
(0.029) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018)
Acquirer is SOE 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Target in High Tech Industry 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Dyad Characteristics
Acquirer & Target in different -0.005 -0.005 + -0.005 + -0.005 + -0.005 +
industries (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Institutional distance -0.004 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.003
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 0.006 -0.004 -0.001 -0.013 -0.012
(0.042) (0.028) (0.027) (0.032) (0.031)
Observations 77 77 77 77 77
Adj. R-Square 0.1531 *** 0.3329 *** 0.3381 *** 0.3241 *** 0.3299 ***
 Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
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Table 16. Fixed-Effects Models Predicting Chinese Firms' CBA Returns, 2000-2010; Business 
Service Industry  
 
Model1
CAR5
Model2
CAR5
Model3
CAR5
Model4
CAR5
Model5
CAR5
Productivity H1 0.041 *** 0.034 ** 0.036 0.027
(Multilateral TFP Index) (0.008) (0.009) (0.022) (0.022)
Productivity* Cross-Listing H2 0.024 0.024
(0.017) (0.018)
Productivity* Institutional Experience Breadth H3 0.034 0.053
(0.151) (0.149)
Moderators
Cross-listing 0.007 0.013 ** 0.007 0.013 *** 0.007
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Institutional Experience Breadth 0.031 0.028 0.029 0.021 0.017
(0.034) (0.025) (0.025) (0.044) (0.043)
Control Variable
Deal Characteristics
Deal Size -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Payment Type 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Nature of Bid 0.007 0.006 + 0.006 + 0.006 + 0.006 +
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Multiple Bidder 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Firm Characteristics
Acquirer Firm Size -0.017 * -0.008 + -0.006 -0.008 + -0.005
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Acquirer Leverageb -0.003 + -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Acquirer Firm Age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisition Experience -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Acquirer's Past Performance 0.025 0.021 0.014 0.021 0.015
(0.021) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Acquirer is SOE 0.012 * 0.007 + 0.005 0.006 0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Target in High Tech Industry 0.009 * 0.006 + 0.006 + 0.006 + 0.006 +
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Dyad Characteristics
Acquirer & Target in different -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
industries (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Institutional distance 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 0.043 -0.007 -0.011 -0.006 -0.010
(0.025) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Observations 67 67 67 67 67
Adj. R-Square 0.2192 *** 0.3445 *** 0.3765 *** 0.3522 *** 0.3713 ***
 Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
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Table 17. Fixed-Effects Models Predicting Chinese Firms' CBA Returns, 2000-2010 Target 
Country: Australia  
 
Model1
CAR5
Model2
CAR5
Model3
CAR5
Model4
CAR5
Model5
CAR5
Productivity H1 0.0039 *** 0.038 *** 0.043 * 0.044 *
(Multilateral TFP Index) (0.006) (0.007) (0.017) (0.017)
Productivity* Cross-Listing H2 0.017 0.019
(0.029) (0.029)
Productivity* Institutional Experience Breadth H3 -0.031 -0.045
(0.106) (0.109)
Moderators
Cross-listing 0.007 0.013 ** 0.009 0.013 ** 0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
Institutional Experience Breadth 0.134 *** 0.100 *** 0.098 *** 0.108 ** 0.111 *
(0.029) (0.025) (0.025) (0.037) (0.038)
Control Variable
Deal Characteristics
Deal Size 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Payment Type 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Nature of Bid -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Multiple Bidder 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Firm Characteristics
Acquirer Firm Size -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Acquirer Leverageb -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Acquirer Firm Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisition Experience -0.008 * -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Acquirer's Past Performance 0.009 + 0.041 * 0.040 * 0.040 * 0.040 *
(0.005) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Acquirer is SOE 0.009 + 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Target in High Tech Industry -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Dyad Characteristics
Acquirer & Target in different 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004
industries (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Institutional distance 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.010
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Constant -0.032 -0.004 -0.031 -0.034 -0.029
(0.043) (0.035) ().029) (0.028) (0.029)
Observations 89 89 89 89 89
Adj. R-Square 0.2222 *** 0.3238 *** 0.3229 *** 0.3231 *** 0.3241 ***
 Country=23,  Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
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Table 18. Fixed-Effects Models Predicting Chinese Firms' CBA Returns, 2000-2010; Target 
Country: Canada  
 
Model1
CAR5
Model2
CAR5
Model3
CAR5
Model4
CAR5
Model5
CAR5
Productivity H1 0.029 *** 0.028 * -0.011 -0.011
(Multilateral TFP Index) (0.011) (0.011) (0.023) (0.023)
Productivity* Cross-Listing H2 0.034 0.028
(0.037) (0.035)
Productivity* Institutional Experience Breadth H3 0.308 + 0.029 +
(0.161) (0.016)
Moderators
Cross-listing 0.006 0.015 + 0.007 0.015 * 0.011
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Institutional Experience Breadth 0.071 0.051 0.044 -0.023 + -0.024
(0.055) (0.051) (0.052) (0.062) (0.063)
Control Variable
Deal Characteristics
Deal Size 0.006 0.007 * 0.007 + 0.007 + 0.007 +
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Payment Type -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Nature of Bid -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Multiple Bidder -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Firm Characteristics
Acquirer Firm Size -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Acquirer Leverageb -0.006 * -0.004 + -0.004 + -0.004 + -0.004 +
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Acquirer Firm Age -0.000 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisition Experience -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Acquirer's Past Performance 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Acquirer is SOE 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.006 0.006
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Target in High Tech Industry 0.009 + 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Dyad Characteristics
Acquirer & Target in different 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003
industries (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Institutional distance 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.007
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 0.008 0.005 -0.000 0.013 0.014
(0.038) (0.035) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034)
Observations 61 61 61 61 61
Adj. R-Square 0.2322 *** 0.2745 *** 0.2822 *** 0.2989 *** 0.3015 ***
 Country=23,  Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
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Table 19. Fixed-Effects Models Predicting Chinese Firms' CBA Returns, 2000-2010 Target 
Country: Germany  
 
Model1
CAR5
Model2
CAR5
Model3
CAR5
Model4
CAR5
Model5
CAR5
Productivity H1 0.031 0.025 0.143 0.126
(Multilateral TFP Index) (0.029) (0.031) (0.116) (0.126)
Productivity* Cross-Listing H2 0.069 0.061
(0.081) (0.086)
Productivity* Institutional Experience Breadth H3 -0.866 -0.783
(0.876) (0.941)
Moderators
Cross-listing 0.007 0.015 -0.004 0.016 -0.001
(0.020) (0.021) (0.031) (0.021) (0.032)
Institutional Experience Breadth 0.121 0.106 0.074 0.367 0.314
(0.125) (0.124) (0.132) (0.293) (0.321)
Control Variable
Deal Characteristics
Deal Size -0.006 0.002 0.003 -0.006 -0.004
(0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018)
Payment Type -0.007 -0.016 -0.009 -0.013 -0.006
(0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.022)
Nature of Bid -0.028 + -0.016 -0.009 -0.025 -0.019
(0.013) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.023)
Multiple Bidder 0.005 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014
(0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Firm Characteristics
Acquirer Firm Size 0.008 0.017 0.012 0.006 0.002
(0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024)
Acquirer Leverageb 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Acquirer Firm Age -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Acquisition Experience -0.004 0.006 -0.004 0.002 0.000
(0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
Acquirer's Past Performance -0.056 0.027 0.013 -0.023 -0.031
(0.092) (0.012) (0.124) (0.131) (0.139)
Acquirer is SOE 0.016 0.011 0.009 0.013 0.012
(0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019)
Target in High Tech Industry -0.018 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.018) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Dyad Characteristics
Acquirer & Target in different -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003
industries (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Institutional distance -0.029 -0.005 0.001 -0.013 -0.007
(0.027) (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.039)
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Constant 0.004 -0.147 -0.127 -0.057 -0.048
(0.171) (0.221) (0.227) (0.281) (0.254)
Observations 31 31 31 31 31
Adj. R-Square 0.3665 *** 0.3921 *** 0.4033 *** 0.4045 *** 0.4261 ***
 Country=23,  Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
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Table 20. Fixed-Effects Models Predicting Chinese Firms' CBA Returns, 2000-2010; Target 
Country: Singapore 
 
 
Model1
CAR5
Model2
CAR5
Model3
CAR5
Model4
CAR5
Model5
CAR5
Productivity H1 0.014 0.006 -0.006 -0.029
(Multilateral TFP Index) (0.018) (0.021) (0.046) (0.054)
Productivity* Cross-Listing H2 0.023 0.033
(0.035) (0.038)
Productivity* Institutional Experience Breadth H3 0.149 0.251
(0.324) (0.347)
Moderators
Cross-listing 0.014 * 0.015 * 0.009 0.014 * 0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.012)
Institutional Experience Breadth 0.077 + 0.067 0.058 0.017 -0.029
(0.044) (0.047) (0.049) (0.118) (0.131)
Control Variable
Deal Characteristics
Deal Size -0.005 + -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Payment Type 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Nature of Bid -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.01)
Multiple Bidder -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.004 -0.003
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Firm Characteristics
Acquirer Firm Size 0.018 + 0.017 + 0.015 0.016 0.014
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
Acquirer Leverageb 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Acquirer Firm Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Acquisition Experience 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Acquirer's Past Performance -0.041 -0.041 -0.048 -0.043 -0.055
(0.039) (0.039) (0.048) (0.041) (0.043)
Acquirer is SOE -0.017 + -0.016 + -0.015 -0.013 -0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
Target in High Tech Industry 0.006 0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
Dyad Characteristics
Acquirer & Target in different -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001
industries (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Institutional distance 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.012 0.009
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Constant -0.088 -0.081 -0.098 -0.081 -0.067
(0.055) (0.057) (0.061) (0.058) (0.061)
Observations 49 49 49 49 49
Adj. R-Square 0.3212 *** 0.3227 *** 0.3362 *** 0.3340 *** 0.3410 ***
 Country=23,  Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
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Table 21. Fixed-Effects Models Predicting Chinese Firms' CBA Returns, 2000-2010; Target 
Country: USA 
 
 
Model1
CAR5
Model2
CAR5
Model3
CAR5
Model4
CAR5
Model5
CAR5
Productivity H1 0.034 *** 0.026 *** 0.023 0.031 *
(Multilateral TFP Index) (0.006) (0.006) (0.021) (0.015)
Productivity* Cross-Listing H2 0.055 ** 0.065 ***
(0.016) (0.017)
Productivity* Institutional Experience Breadth H3 0.073 0.236 +
(0.013) (0.128)
Moderators
Cross-listing 0.009 *** 0.013 *** 0.004 0.013 *** 0.003 **
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Institutional Experience Breadth 0.094 *** 0.089 *** 0.081 *** 0.069 + 0.015 +
(0.023) (0.021) (0.019) (0.041) (0.041)
Control Variable
Deal Characteristics
Deal Size 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Payment Type -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Nature of Bid -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Multiple Bidder 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Firm Characteristics
Acquirer Firm Size 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Acquirer Leverageb 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Acquirer Firm Age -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Acquisition Experience -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Acquirer's Past Performance 0.009 0.009 0.005 0.009 0.004
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Acquirer is SOE 0.007 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Target in High Tech Industry 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Dyad Characteristics
Acquirer & Target in different -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
industries (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Institutional distance 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included
Constant -0.305 -0.043 + -0.041 + -0.037 -0.017
(0.027) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.026)
Observations 124 124 124 124 124
Adj. R-Square 0.3737 *** 0.2727 *** 0.2876 *** 0.2728 *** 0.3031 ***
 Country=23,  Standard errors in parentheses ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, +p<0.1
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Figure 1. Theoretical Model 
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 Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
 
Figure 2. Effects of Cross-Listing and Breadth of Relevant Institutional Experience on the 
Relationship between Productivity and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
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